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As of March 1991 the Resolution Trust Corporation had taken
control of more than 580 financial institutions, instituted suits against
fifty-eight individual lawyers and law firms, and suggested that it
might bring numerous additional suits over lawyer misconduct related
to the failure of more than 140 thrift institutions.1 The Federal Office
of Thrift Supervision's general counsel has taken the position that pro-
fessionals played key roles in facilitating the savings and loan indus-
try's implosion: "Our own view is that few of the frauds and none of
the high-risk schemes could have been undertaken without the active
assistance of professionals, including lawyers and accountants." '2 In the
same vein, a federal judge recently adverted to unanswered questions
posed by the notorious Lincoln Savings and Loan debacle:
Keating testified that he was so bent on doing the "right thing" that
he surrounded himself with literally scores of accountants and lawyers
to make sure all the transactions were legal. The questions that must
be asked are:
Where were these professionals, a number of whom are now as-
serting their rights under the Fifth Amendment, when these clearly
improper transactions were being consummated?
Why didn't any of them speak up or disassociate themselves from
the transactions?
Where also were the outside accountants and attorneys when
these transactions were effectuated?
What is difficult to understand is that with all the professional
talent involved (both accounting and legal), why at least one profes-
sional would not have blown the whistle to stop the overreaching that
took place in this case.'
Professionals these days are not just the targets of rhetorical ques-
tions. Increasingly they are being forced into a role of the deep pocket
of last resort.4 Civil suits against lawyers and accountants come in all
1. Schmidt, Panel: "Where Were the Lawyers During S&L Crisis?", Wash. Post,
Mar. 23, 1991, at B1, cols. 2-4.
2. Id.
3. Lincoln Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Wall, 743 F. Supp. 901, 919-20 (D.D.C. 1990).
4. E.g., France, Savings & Loan Lawyers, 77 A.BA. J. 52 (1991) (mentioning the
Kaye, Scholer law firm's payment of $20 million in Keating-related litigation, noting an
"avalanche of litigation" and forecasting that at least 100 more suits against counsel for
failed thrifts were expected to be filed by the end of the year); Newdorf, Ex-partners
Targeted in S&L Cleanup, Legal Times, May 27, 1991, at 10 (noting that in the govern-
ment's $1 billion civil fraud suit arising out of the Lincoln Savings and Loan collapse,
the RTC, apparently for the first time, named a law firm's partners, including former
partners, as class defendants; article also mentions an $18 million settlement with Jen-
kins & Gilchrist, a Dallas law firm, relating to the failure of two thrifts); Granelli, Law
1991]
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forms, from garden variety malpractice or fiduciary duty cases to more
esoteric claims under statutes such as state deceptive trade practices
acts.5 It is safe to say, however, that as a group no civil actions insti-
tuted against professionals are more feared than those premised on al-
legations of scienter, whether in the form of common-law fraud claims,
aiding and abetting or conspiracy allegationg, civil RICO or securities
law violations, or some other species of claim built around scienter.
If proved, such scienter-based claims generate multiple problems
for the defendant professional. For one, fraud-related damage awards
may fall outside malpractice insurance policy coverages, which tend
not to provide protection for fraud-related conduct.' Civil fraud suits
brought under the federal civil RICO statute7 or under rule 10b-58 may
Firm Reaches Settlement in Lincoln S&L Case, L.A. Times, May 21, 1991, at pt. D, p. 7,
col. 2 (mentioning that Chicago's Sidley and Austin law firm agreed to pay up to $34
million to settle Lincoln-related class action claims). See also Greer, CPA Firm Loses
Big in Local Court, Hous. Bus. J., Feb. 5, 1990, at sec. 1, p. 1 (reporting on entry of a
$37.7 million judgment, after a jury trial, against the now-bankrupt Laventhol & Hor-
wath accounting firm based on their involvement in a Herman Finesod tax shelter
"designed to profit Finesod and his accomplices at the expense of limited partner inves-
tors." The luckless accounting firm later settled the suit for $13.5 million of which only
$4.4 million was covered by insurance.); Berton, Bad Numbers: Laventhol & Horwath,
Beset By Litigation, Runs Into Hard Times, Wall St. J., May 17, 1990, at sec. 1, p. 1, col
6.
5. Suits against lawyers under state deceptive trade practices statutes have been
upheld by the Supreme Courts of Texas, Connecticut, and Massachusetts. See Heslin v.
Connecticut Law Clinic of Trantolo & Trantolo, 190 Conn. 510, 461 A.2d 938 (1983);
Guenard v. Burke, 387 Mass. 802, 443 N.E.2d 892 (1982); DeBakey v. Staggs, 612 S.W.2d
924 (Tex. 1981). The Montana Supreme Court has indicated that such a claim may exist.
Matthews v. Berryman, 196 Mont. 49, 637 P.2d 822 (1981). The Illinois and New Hamp-
shire Supreme Courts have rejected the notion. Frahm v. Urkovich, 113 IlM. App. 3d 580,
447 N.E.2d 1007 (1983); Rousseau v. Eshleman, 128 N.H. 564, 519 A.2d 243 (1986).
6. See, e.g., Humphreys v. Niagara Fire Ins. Co., - Pa. Super. -, 590 A.2d 1267
(1991) (exclusion covering fraudulent or dishonest acts covered civil RICO allegations
and supported insurer's decision not to provide a defense to such claims); Lerman, Lying
to Clients, 138 U. PA. L. REv. 659, 697 (1990).
7. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1990) (Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations).
8. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1991). Adopted under § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b)(1988), Rule 10b-5 makes it unlawful to use the mails or
an instrumentality of interstate commerce:
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact, or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of
the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1991).
[Vol. 42
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be framed as federal class actions that can result in massive liability.9
Other hazards are the risk of a heavy punitive damages award, which
may be excluded from malpractice insurance coverage, 10 as well as the
possibility, if not the certainty, of ethical sanctions if a scienter-based
judgment is entered.
Aside from the enhanced remedies that may accompany scienter-
linked lawsuits, civil claims against professionals premised on scienter
allegations present a major advantage for plaintiffs by allowing circum-
vention of the privity defense.1 The bounds of professional liability for
simple negligence, that is, honest blunders unaccompanied by proof of
fraud, are still fairly narrow.12 Thus, injured nonclients, such as victims
of swindles made possible through professionals' services, have a great
incentive to attack professionals with precisely the type of lawsuit that
is the most fearsome. Indeed, in jurisdictions that circumscribe profes-
sionals' liability to nonclients for negligence, injured third parties may
have no choice but to consider suing for fraud.
This Article explores the element of scienter, also called "intent,"
or "guilty knowledge," as it applies in litigation against defendant pro-
fessionals. It examines scienter from three perspectives: what it is, how
it needs to be pleaded, and how it can be proved. The discussion fo-
cuses on what scienter means at common law, under federal common
law, and under criminal statutes. The discussion shows a tendency on
the part of federal courts to slant the formulation of the scienter ele-
ment in federal civil fraud in favor of professionals. Pleading require-
ments in federal civil fraud cases likewise are distorted in favor of the
defense in civil cases against professionals. This Article suggests the
theory of conscious avoidance as a means of counteracting undue judi-
cial solicitude for professional defendants in civil fraud cases. The use
of conscious avoidance as a means of proving knowledge or intent has
been approved repeatedly in federal criminal cases prosecuted against
participants in illegal schemes.
9. For a discussion of professionals' liability under the RICO statute, see Wright,
Why Are Professionals Worried About RICO?, 65 NoTRE DAME L. REV. 983 (1990).
10. See J. SUTrON & J. DzEmqaowsu, PROFESSIONAL RE PONSIBILTY OF LAwYRs 162
(1989) (noting that lawyer malpractice policies typically exclude coverage for punitive
damages).
11. See Wright, supra note 9, at 985-88.
12. For a discussion of the differing positions taken on the privity issue, see Free-
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II. THE DEFINITION OF SCIENTER
A. The Common-Law Standard for Scienter
1. Primary Liability
The seminal common-law case on the mental element of the cause
of action for fraud or deceit, usually referred to as scienter, 13 is the
English case of Derry v. Peek.14 In Derry a special act of Parliament
had authorized the Plymouth, Devonport & District Tramway Com-
pany to make certain tramways. The act provided that the tramways
could be moved by animal power and, with consent of the Board of
Trade, by steam or mechanical power for a fixed period subject to reg-
ulation by the Board. In February 1883 the directors of the company
issued a prospectus with the following statement:
One great feature of this undertaking, to which considerable im-
portance should be attached, is, that by the special Act of Parliament
obtained, the company has the right to use steam or mechanical mo-
tive power, instead of horses, and it is fully expected that by means of
this a considerable saving will result in the working expenses of the
line as compared with other tramways worked by horses.15
The company proceeded to produce tramways but the Board of
Trade refused to consent to the use of steam or mechanical power, ex-
cept on certain portions of the tramways. As a result, the company
went out of business. The plaintiff, a purchaser of the company's stock,
sued, alleging that the prospectus had fraudulently induced him to ac-
quire his shares.
The trial court found for the defendants on the ground that they
13. Scienter is only one of the elements of a cause of action for fraud. The elements
have been summarized as follows:
1. A false representation made by the defendant. In the ordinary case, this
representation must be one of fact.
2. Knowledge or belief on the part of the defendant that the representation is
false-or, what is regarded as equivalent, that he has not a sufficient basis of
information to make it. This element often is given the technical name of
"scienter."
3. An intention to induce the plaintiff to act or to refrain from action in reli-
ance upon the misrepresentation.
4. Justifiable reliance upon the representation on the part of the plaintiff, in
taking action or refraining from it.
5. Damage to the plaintiff, resulting from such reliance.
W. KETON, D. DOBBS, R. ItETON, & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON ThE LAW OF
TORTS 728 (6th ed. 1984) (footnotes omitted) [hereinafter Prosser & Keeton].
14. 14 App. Cas. 337 (H.L. 1889).
15. Id. at 338.
[Vol. 42
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had believed honestly that their statements were true. The court of
appeals reversed. Justice Cotton had stated the applicable rule in the
court below:
"What in my opinion is a correct statement of the law is this, that
where a man makes a statement to be acted upon by others which is
false, and which is known by him to be false, or is made by him reck-
lessly, or without care whether it is true or false, that is, without any
reasonable ground for believing it to be true, he is liable in an action
of deceit at the suit of anyone to whom it was addressed or anyone of
the class to whom it was addressed and who was materially induced
by the misstatement to do an act to his prejudice.""6
The House of Lords reversed. Lord Herschell drew a distinction be-
tween a statement made honestly but without reasonable belief in its
truth, and a statement made recklessly, without caring whether it was
true or false.17 To Lord Herschell the latter was fraudulent, while the
former was not.' Thus, Lord Herschell summarized the requirements
for proof of fraud: "[F]raud is proved when it is shewn that a false
representation has been made (1) knowingly, or (2) without belief in its
truth, or (3) recklessly, careless whether it be true or false."'19
Lord Herschell differentiated between the legal standard for fraud
and evidence of fraud:
I think there is here some confusion between that which is evi-
dence of fraud, and that which constitutes it. A consideration of the
grounds of belief is no doubt an important aid in ascertaining whether
the belief was really entertained. A man's mere assertion that he be-
lieved the statement he made to be true is not accepted as conclusive
proof that he did so. There may be such an absence of reasonable
ground for his belief as, in spite of his assertion, to carry conviction to
the mind that he had not really the belief which he alleges. 20
Applying the principles to the facts of the case, Lord Herschell
16. Id. at 360-61 (emphasis added) (quoting opinion of Cotton, L.J., in the lower
court).
17. Id. at 359-80.
18. See id. at 361.
19. Id. at 374. Earlier in the opinion, Lord Herschell stated that a person could be
liable for fraud even though the person did not know that his statement was false:
[A] person making any statement which he intends another to act upon must
be taken to warrant his belief in its truth. Any person making such a statement
must always be aware that the person to whom it is made will understand, if
not that he who makes it knows, yet at least that he believes it to be true. And
if he has no such belief he is as much guilty of fraud as if he had made any
other representation which he knew to be false, or did not believe to be true.
Id. at 368 (emphasis in original).
20. Id. at 369.
1991]
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ruled that the court of appeals erred in finding fraud and reinstated
the decision of the trial judge dismissing the action. He placed great
weight on the trial judge's acceptance of the defendants' testimony, be-
cause he had the opportunity to observe the demeanor of the wit-
nesses.2 1 The defendants' testimony showed that they had submitted
plans to use mechanical power to the Board of Trade and that they
had received no objection to their proposal. The defendants also testi-
fied that they believed that Board of Trade approval was a formality
and would follow as a matter of course.
22
Derry holds that a person can be liable for fraud when the person
makes a statement recklessly. However, the court defined recklessness
narrowly. According to the court, if the person made the statement
with an honest but unreasonable belief in its truth, no liability for
fraud would lie.
American courts often have been willing to go beyond the narrow
concept of recklessness employed in Derry. An early example is Chat-
ham Furnace Co. v. Moffatt,23 an action for fraud brought by the pur-
chaser of a mine claiming that the defendant had misrepresented the
quantity of ore in the mine. The court stated that when a person
makes an unqualified assertion of a fact that is susceptible to knowl-
edge, rather than being merely a matter of opinion, the person is liable
for fraud if the statement is false, even if the person honestly believed
his statement was true.2' Similarly, in Pumphrey v. Quillen25 the plain-
tiffs sued for damages for fraud in connection with the sale of a house.
The defendant broker had made representations about the construc-
tion of the home that he believed to be true but turned out to be false.
The Ohio Supreme Court held that when a person expressly or im-
pliedly asserts a fact of his own knowledge, he will be held liable for
fraud if the fact is untrue, even if he believed the fact to be true.2"
Other cases have adopted a similar view.
27
This broad view of recklessness also has been applied to cases in-
volving the liability of professionals, such as accountants or lawyers,
for fraud. The well-known case of Ultramares Corp. v. Touche
2s is il-
21. Id. at 377.
22. Id. at 378-79.
23. 147 Mass. 403, 18 N.E. 168 (1888).
24. Id. at 406, 18 N.E. at 169-70.
25. 165 Ohio St. 343, 135 N.E.2d 328 (1956).
26. Id. at 345, 135 N.E.2d at 330-32.
27. E.g., Becker v. McKinnie, 106 Kan. 426, 186 P. 496 (1920) (false statements
about quantity of water; defendant cannot escape liability for unqualified statements,
even if he believed them to be true). See generally Keeton, Fraud: The Necessity for an
Intent to Deceive, 5 UCLA L. REv. 583 (1958).
28. 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931).
[Vol. 42
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lustrative. In Ultramares the defendant, a firm of public accountants,
was employed by Fred Stern & Co., a rubber importer, to prepare a
balance sheet. The certificate of the defendant, which was attached to
the balance sheet, stated as follows:
We have examined the accounts of Fred Stern & Co., Inc., for the
year ending December 31, 1923, and hereby certify that the annexed
balance sheet is in accordance therewith and with the information and
explanations given us. We further certify that, subject to provision for
federal taxes on income, the said statement, in our opinion, presents a
true and correct view of the financial condition of Fred Stern & Co.,
Inc., as at December 31, 1923.29
The balance sheet showed that the firm had a net worth of over one
million dollars when, in fact, the company was insolvent.3 0 Fred Stern
approached the plaintiff to obtain loans to finance the sale of rubber.
As a condition for granting the loans, the plaintiff requested a certified
balance sheet. In response Fred Stern gave the plaintiff one of the
statements certified by the defendant. During the next year, the plain-
tiff made a series of loans to Fred Stern until the company declared
bankruptcy. The plaintiff brought suit against the accounting firm.
Count one alleged that the balance sheet had been prepared negli-
gently; count two claimed fraud. The trial judge dismissed the fraud
count without submitting it to the jury, but submitted the negligence
count to the jury, which returned a verdict for the plaintiff. The trial
judge then granted the defendant's motion to dismiss, which had been
reserved pending the jury verdict. The appellate division affirmed the
dismissal of the fraud count, but reversed the dismissal of the negli-
gence count and reinstated the verdict.
31
The bulk of the opinion of the court of appeals focused on the
negligence count. Judge Cardozo expressed concern about imposing lia-
bility on the defendants "in an indeterminate amount for an indeter-
minate time to an indeterminate class."31 2 Without clearly defining the
scope of liability for negligence, Cardozo ruled on the facts of the case
that the defendant's duty to use due care did not extend to the plain-
tiff. While rejecting liability for negligence, Cardozo recognized that
the defendants could be held liable to the plaintiffs for fraud. Cardozo
explained that fraud was not limited to cases of statements known to
be false, nor would an honest belief in the truth of the statement nec-
essarily exonerate a person from fraud: "The defendants certified as a
fact, true to their own knowledge, that the balance sheet was in accor-
29. Id. at 174, 174 N.E. at 442.
30. Id. at 175, 174 N.E. at 442.
31. Id. at 176, 174 N.E. at 443.
32. Id. at 179, 174 N.E. at 444.
1991]
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dance with the books of account. If their statement was false, they are
not to be exonerated because they believed it to be true."3
The Restatement (Second) of Torts adopts the American view of
liability for fraud for statements that are made recklessly. Section 526,
captioned "Conditions under which Misrepresentation is Fraudulent
(Scienter)"'3' provides:
A misrepresentation is fraudulent if the maker
(a) knows or believes that the matter is not as he represents it
to be,
(b) does not have the confidence in the accuracy of his represen-
tation that he states or implies, or
(c) knows that he does not have the basis for his representation
that he states or implies.38
The comments develop the scope of these rules in greater detail.
Under comment d, a statement made negligently is not enough to im-
pose liability for fraud. Negligence, however, is evidence that a state-
ment was made without honest belief in its truth. Comment e pro-
vides that liability for fraud may be found even though the maker of
the statement did not know or believe that his statement was false
when the statement was made "recklessly":
It is enough that being conscious that he has neither knowledge nor
belief in the existence of the matter he chooses to assert it as a fact.
Indeed, since knowledge implies a firm conviction, a misrepresenta-
tion of a fact so made as to assert that the maker knows it, is fraudu-
lent if he is conscious that he has merely a belief in its existence and
recognizes that there is a chance, more or less great, that the fact may
not be as it is represented. This is often expressed by saying that
fraud is proved if it is shown that a false representation has been
made without belief in its truth or recklessly, careless of whether it is
true or false.Y
33. Id. at 189, 174 N.E. at 448.
34. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 526 (1977).
35. Id.
36. Comment d provides:
The fact that the misrepresentation is one that a man of ordinary care and
intelligence in the maker's situation would have recognized as false is not
enough to impose liability upon the maker for a fraudulent misrepresentation
under the rule stated in this Section, but it is evidence from which his lack of
honest belief may be inferred. So, too, it is a matter to be taken into account in
determining the credibility of the defendant if he testifies that he believed his
representation to be true.
Id. comment d.
37. Id. comment e. See also id. § 527(c), which provides that a maker of an ambig-
uous statement is liable for fraud if he makes the statement "with reckless indifference
as to how it will be understood."
[Vol. 42
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Comment f states that when a person makes a representation ei-
ther expressly or impliedly based on his personal knowledge or on his
personal investigation, he is liable for fraud if the statement is false
even though the maker honestly believes in the truth of his
statement. 8
2. Secondary Liability for Intentional Acts at Common Law: Civil
Conspiracy and Aider and Abettor Theory
Since the earliest days of the English common law, courts have
recognized a basis for liability based on actions taken in concert with
others. The writ of conspiracy, though originally limited to conspiracies
to prosecute another, gradually widened to cover other misconduct.5 9
Writing in 1937, Professor William Prosser attempted to bring some
intellectual order to the area of "joint torts" by organizing the case law
into nine categories. 40 For our purposes, two of these are of particular
significance: liability for tortious conduct done pursuant to a common
design (civil conspiracy liability) and liability for rendering substantial
assistance to the tortious conduct of another (aider and abettor liabil-
ity). Both find expression in section 876 of the Restatement (Second)
of Torts:
§ 876. Persons Acting in Concert
For harm resulting to a third person from the tortious conduct of an-
other, one is subject to liability if he
(a) does a tortious act-in concert with the other or pursuant to a
common design with him, or
(b) knows that the other's conduct constitutes a breach of duty
and gives substantial assistance or encouragement to the other so to
conduct himself, or
(c) gives substantial assistance to the other in accomplishing a
tortious result and his own conduct, separately considered, constitutes
a breach of duty to the third person.41
The comments to section 876 clarify the elements and relationship
38. Id. § 526(f).
39. 3 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 401-07 (1973).
40. Prosser, Joint Torts and Several Liability, 25 CALm. L. REv. 413, 429-42 (1937).
41. RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS § 876 (1977). RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
AGENCY § 348 (1957) is similar:
Fraud and Duress
An agent who fraudulently makes representations, uses duress, or know-
ingly assists in the commission of tortious fraud or duress by his princi-
pal or by others is subject to liability in tort to the injured person al-
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of the civil conspiracy and aider and abettor theories of liability. Civil
conspiracy42 is composed of two elements. First, "an agreement to co-
operate in a particular line of conduct or to accomplish a particular
result"'43 must exist. However, the agreement need not be express, but
may be implied from the actors' conduct.44 Second, each of the parties
to the conspiracy must engage in tortious conduct.45 Under the Re-
statement formulation, the mere existence of a common plan or design
is not sufficient to establish liability. As comment c states:
In order for the rules stated in Clause (a) to be applicable, it is
essential that the conduct of the actor be in itself tortious. One who
innocently, rightfully and carefully does an act that has the effect of
furthering the tortious conduct or cooperating in the tortious design
of another is not for that reason subject to liability.
46
The California Supreme Court recently dealt with the scope of
professional liability for civil conspiracy under a common-law theory.
In Doctors' Co. v. Superior Court47 the plaintiff brought a medical mal-
practice action against the doctor's insurer. Count I of the complaint
charged the insurer with violating its statutory duty to attempt settle-
ment. Count II allegea that the attorneys retained by the insurer en-
tered into a conspiracy with the insurer to retain a doctor who only
partially would review the facts and records surrounding the medical
malpractice action and would then give a false medical opinion that
the insurer could use as an excuse to deny prompt settlement of the
plaintiff's claim. Citing earlier California cases, the court enumerated
the elements of a claim for civil conspiracy:
"The elements of an action for civil conspiracy are the formation and
operation of the conspiracy and damage resulting to plaintiff from an
act or acts done in furtherance of the common design.. . . In such an
action the major significance of the conspiracy lies in the fact that it
renders each participant in the wrongful act responsible as a joint
tortfeasor for all damages ensuing from the wrong, irrespective of
whether or not he was a direct actor and regardless of the degree of
his activity.
4 8
The court then discussed the requirement of acts in furtherance of
42. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 876 comment b (1977) refers to
"conspiracy."
43. Id. comment a.
44. Id.
45. Id. comment c.
46. Id.
47. 49 Cal. 3d 39, 775 P.2d 508, 260 Cal. Rptr. 183 (1989) (en bane).
48. Id. at 44, 775 P.2d at 510-11, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 185-86 (quoting Mox, Inc. v.
Woods, 202 Cal. 675, 262 P. 302 (1927)).
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A cause of action for civil conspiracy may not arise, however, if the
alleged conspirator, though a participant in the agreement underlying
the injury, was not personally bound by the duty violated by the
wrongdoing and was acting only as the agent or employee of the party
who did have that duty.49
Finding that the statutory duty involved applied only to the insurers
and not to the attorneys, the court entered an order requiring dismissal
of the conspiracy claim against the attorneys.
The court was careful, however, to point out the limited nature of
its holding and to emphasize that in other situations attorneys could
be liable for conspiracy with their clients. The court furnished several
examples of situations in which a conspiracy claim could be asserted.
First, an attorney may be held liable for a civil conspiracy if the attor-
ney is "acting not only in the performance of a professional duty to
serve the client but also in furtherance of the attorney's own financial
gain. '5° The court cited Black v. Sullivan,51 in which attorneys were
held liable for aiding and abetting and conspiring with their clients,
the trustees of a trust, to fail to provide a statement of balance due as
required by statute. The attorneys had a personal financial interest in
the matter because they had taken an assignment of an interest in the
trust as security for their legal fees. Second, when the attorney's con-
duct violates the attorney's own duty to the plaintiff, the attorney may
be held liable for a civil conspiracy. The court cited Barney v. Aetna
Casualty & Surety Co.,52 in which attorneys retained by the insurer to
defend the insured settled the suit without notice to the insured. The
insured's conspiracy action against the attorneys and the insurer was
upheld since the attorneys had violated an independent fiduciary duty
to the insured. Third, when attorneys or other agents engage in actual
fraud, they can be held liable for conspiracy because they possess an
independent duty not to engage in actionable misrepresentation.5 3 The
court also averred that its holding did not apply to corporate officers
and directors "who directly order, authorize, or participate in the cor-
poration's tortious conduct. Such persons may be held liable, as con-
spirators or otherwise, for violation of their own duties towards persons
injured by the corporate tort.M
4
Doctors' Co. creates an undeserved and illogical loophole for law-
49. Id., 775 P.2d at 511, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 186.
50. Id. at 46, 775 P.2d at 512, 260 Cal. Rptr. at 187 (emphasis added).
51. 48 Cal. App. 3d 557, 122 Cal. Rptr. 119 (1975).
52. 185 Cal. App. 3d 966, 230 Cal. Rptr. 215 (1986).
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yers who knowingly participate in their clients' wrongs as conspirators.
First, the opinion lacks symmetry. Breach of a direct duty flowing from
the conspirator-lawyer to the victim was demanded, and three situa-
tions were posited in which a lawyer can be liable as a co-conspirator:
(1) through participation in actual fraud, (2) through breach of a direct
duty owed to the victim, and (3) when the lawyer acts in furtherance of
his own financial gain. If civil conspiracy liability requires breach of a
separate duty, the first two situations qualify, but not the third. The
third factor goes to scienter and motive, not to duty.
Also suspect is the logic underlying the court's willingness to im-
pose conspirator liability on the insurer's directors or officers who au-
thorize or participate in the corporation's tortious conduct, but not to
"subordinate employees and . . . agents retained. . . as independent
contractors . . . ."5 If, as the court suggested, conspiratorial acts by
agents with their principals are not reached by a civil conspiracy the-
ory, then it is hard to understand why the court envisioned insider
agents as appropriate targets of a civil conspiracy claim. As between
the two types of conspirators, the outsiders' lack of close connection to
their principals suggests they could more easily fill the co-conspirator
bill. Contrary to the Doctors' Co. court's suggestion, a civil conspiracy
between a company and outside counsel arguably is easier to establish
than one with inside counsel.
56
There is also a logical problem with discriminating between corpo-
rate insiders and outsiders. If exactly the same injuries are caused by
Insurer A's in-house Senior Vice-President/General Counsel, and, in a
second case, by the senior partner of Insurer B's agent-independent
contractor outside counsel, Doctors' Co. holds that the in-house general
counsel may face conspiracy liability, but the outside lawyer will not.
This is arbitrary. Disparate treatment cannot be justified based on the
overt acts performed, since they are the same. Nor is there any differ-
55. Id., 260 Cal. Rptr. at 189.
56. One court has asserted:
A corporate conspiracy requires more than the collective judgment of two indi-
viduals within the same entity, for their conduct, if challenged, becomes that of
the single, corporate entity. Jagielski v. Package Mach. Co., 489 F. Supp. 232
(E.D. Pa. 1980); see, e.g., Thompson, 412 A.2d at 473; Chambers Development
Co., Inc. v. Browning-Ferris Industries, 590 F. Supp. 1528, 1541-42 (W.D. Pa.
1984). Pursuant to this precedent, defendants argue that the conspiracy al-
leged in the Complaint describes defendants acting in their corporate capaci-
ties. As such, they acted as part of the corporate singularity and, thus, cannot
conspire with that singularity. If such was the only credible reading of Mr.
Sanzone's Complaint, this court would be compelled to dismiss the civil con-
spiracy count.
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ence from the victim's standpoint, since the injury in either case is
identical. Nor can exempting the independent contractor-lawyer from
liability be justified based on the coincidence of full-time employment,
since the professional obligation of either lawyer in handling the mat-
ter is the same. Both hypothetical lawyers have a general professional
obligation not to counsel or knowingly assist their clients' fraudulent or
criminal acts. 57 Indeed, it is questionable why this global, independent
professional obligation not to further impropriety would not itself suf-
fice to supply any necessary "breach of duty" element.
Doctors' Co. illustrates the tendency of courts to engineer results
to protect lawyers (at least outside counsel) as a class. It also shows the
irrationality that arbitrary classifications foster. A more direct and
principled approach to professional conspiracy liability at common law
recognizes that the confluence of an agreement, plus a wrongful act by
"one of the parties in pursuance of the agreement,"58s plus damage to
the victim proximately caused, may yield the tort of civil conspiracy.59
This latter approach was taken by the California federal district court
in Koehler v. Pulvers.60 The Koehler court upheld a civil conspiracy
claim in a limited partnership case against a lawyer alleged to have
conspired in the developers' breach of their fiduciary duty owed to the
limited partner investors.61 Implicitly recognized in Koehler, but never
57. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDuCT Rules 1.2(d), 1.13, 1.16(a)(1)
(1983); MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSmILrrY DR 1-102(4), 7-102(A)(1), (7), (8)
(1980); RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDUCT OF THE STATE BAR OF CAL. Rule 3-210. See also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 348 (1957) (agent liable for knowingly assisting
fraud or duress).
58. Prosser & Keeton, supra note 13, § 46, at 324.
59. Of course, this depends on which state is involved. For example, New York
does not recognize an independent tort of civil conspiracy. See Legion Lighting v. Swit-
zer Group, Inc., - A.D.2d _, 567 N.Y.S.2d 52 (1991). Other states do, including Mary-
land, Michigan, Pennsylvania, Texas, and South Carolina. See Green v. Washington
Suburban Sanitary Comm'n, 259 Md. 206, 269 A.2d 815 (1970); Fenestra Inc. v. Gulf Am.
Land Corp., 377 Mich. 565, 141 N.W.2d 36 (1966); Thompson Coal Co. v. Pike Coal Co.,
488 Pa. 198, 412 A.2d 466 (1979); Schlumberger Well Surveying Corp. v. Nortex Oil &
Gas Corp., 435 S.W.2d 854 (Tex. 1968). In South Carolina, "[a] civil conspiracy ...
consists of three elements: (1) a combination of two or more persons, (2) for the purpose
of injuring the plaintiff, (3) which causes him special damage." Lee v. Chesterfield Gen.
Hosp., Inc., 289 S.C. 6, 10, 344 S.E.2d 379, 382 (Ct. App. 1986). See also Yaeger v. Mur-
phy, 291 S.C. 485, 354 S.E.2d 393 (Ct. App. 1987). Other states have other formulations.
For example, Texas recognizes that civil conspiracy consists of "'a combination by two
or more persons to accomplish an unlawful purpose or to accomplish a lawful purpose by
unlawful means.'" Fenslage v. Dawkins, 629 F.2d 1107, 1110 (5th Cir. 1980) (quoting
Schlumberger Well Surveying v. Nortex Oil & Gas, 435 S.W.2d 854, 856 (Tex. 1968)).
60. 606 F. Supp. 164 (S.D. Cal. 1985).
61. The court in Koehler cited with approval the leading California case of Roberts
v. Ball, Hunt, Hart, Brown & Baerwitz, 57 Cal. App. 3d 104, 109, 128 Cal. Rptr. 901, 905
(1976), for the proposition that "'California has long adopted the view that an attorney
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considered in Doctors' Co., is the well-established tenet that "unless
there is a privilege to do so, a person is under a duty to refrain from
intentionally causing another to violate a duty to a third.
'82
In retrospect, perhaps the plaintiff in Doctors' Co. would have
fared better by including an aider and abettor claim against the lawyer
attacked as a co-conspirator. A plaintiff must prove two elements to
establish aider and abettor liability tied to another's wrong. First, the
alleged aider and abettor must know that the primary actor's conduct
constitutes a breach of some duty. Second, the defendant must know-
ingly give "substantial assistance or encouragement" to the other.
6 3
The scope of common-law aider and abettor liability is illustrated by
the recent case of Blow v. Shaughnessy." Blow involved an action
against an investment advisor for fraud in connection with the han-
dling of investment accounts. Several brokers were accused of aiding
and abetting the fraud by executing trades for the advisor when they
had knowledge of the fraud.
Relying on subsection 876(b) and federal court decisions in securi-
ties litigation, the court in Blow recognized a common-law action for
aiding and abetting a tort. The court defined the action as having three
elements: (1) the existence of a securities law violation by the primary
party; (2) knowledge of the violation on the part of the aider and abet-
tor; and (3) substantial assistance by the aider and abettor in the
achievement of the primary violation.
5
Focusing on the requirement of "substantial assistance," the court
approved the following instruction given by the trial court: "Substan-
tial assistance is defined as a large amount or quantity of assistance as
distinguished from nominal or routine assistance. Assistance may be
said to be substantial when it was a significant factor in bringing about
the violation complained of, that is, the false reporting of unit val-
ues."66 The court also ruled that inaction could be a basis of liability
when the person either owed the victim an independent duty or con-
sciously intended to assist in the perpetration of the wrong. 7 With its
may not with impunity, either conspire with a client to defraud or injure a third person
or engage in intentional tortious conduct toward a third person.' " Koehler, 606 F. Supp.
at 173.
62. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF AGENCY § 312 comment a (1957).
63. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 876(b) (1977). Subsection 876(c) discusses
another form of aider and abettor liability. This subsection dispenses with the require-
ment of knowledge of the other party's tortious conduct, but adds the requirement that
the aider and abettor's conduct be a breach of duty to the third person.
64. 88 N.C. App. 484, 364 S.E.2d 444 (1988).
65. Id. at 490, 364 S.E.2d at 447.
66. Id. at 488, 364 S.E.2d at 447.
67. Id. at 490-91, 364 S.E.2d at 447-48. The court affirmed a jury verdict for the
securities brokers. The jury's verdict can be justified either on the ground that the de-
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common sense, Restatement-grounded logic that knowing complicity is
as wrongful as the independent wrong itself, Blow and its progeny6"
promise to create scienter-related problems in common-law cases for
generations of professionals to come.
B. Defining Scienter in Securities and Civil RICO Suits Against
Professionals
1. Introduction
In addition to common-law theories, civil cases against profession-
als tend to be built around claims of securities fraud or RICO allega-
tions premised on mail fraud, wire fraud, and conspiracy, fields in
which there is already a fair amount of criminal precedent.6 9 Criminal
law precedent must logically furnish the scienter standard for civil
RICO cases, since the statute merely allows civil recovery for what are
criminal acts."0 This is not the same thing as saying that the scienter
requirement in civil RICO cases automatically ratchets upward to cold-
blooded, deliberate intent, however. As will be discussed, "knowledge"
is easier to establish in criminal cases than civil litigators may imagine,
and, for many purposes, recklessness can suffice to provide an infer-
ence of guilty knowledge and criminal culpability. Criminal cases deal-
ing with the intent issue are considered in a subsequent section."
fendant brokers did not know of the fraud (they denied being informed) or that the
execution of trades alone was not suffcient assistance for aider and abettor liability.
68. The concept that one may wrongfully aid and abet another's breach of duty,
and thus become liable for it, is not well developed at common law. Recently, in the
investment fraud case of In re Rospatch Sec. Litig., 760 F. Supp. 1239 (W.D. Mich.
1991), the district court professed not to find "any law recognizing this cause of action."
Id. at 1265. The law firm in the Rospatch case was charged with having aided and abet-
ted a breach of trust. Notwithstanding the district court's comment about a lack of au-
thority, Blow is on the books, and it is clear that complicity in another's misconduct may
be actionable at common law. See, e.g., supra note 63 and accompanying text.
69. See, e.g., United States v. Nicholson, 677 F.2d 706, 710-11 (9th Cir. 1982) (drug
conspiracy); United States v. Brien, 617 F.2d 299, 312 (1st Cir.) (mail fraud), cert. de-
nied, 446 U.S. 919 (1980); United States v. Joyce, 499 F.2d 9, 23 (7th Cir.) (mail fraud),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1031 (1974); United States v. Sarantos, 455 F.2d 877, 880, 882 (2d
Cir. 1972) (conspiracy); United States v. Sheiner, 410 F.2d 337, 340-41 (2d Cir.) (mail
and wire fraud), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 825 (1969); United States v. Benjamin, 328 F.2d
854 (2d Cir.) (securities fraud), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 953 (1964).
70. See Mathews, Shifting the Burden of Losses in the Securities Markets: The
Role of Civil RICO in Securities Litigation, 65 NomE DAME L. REv. 896, 949-53 (1990).
71. See infra notes 199-294 and accompanying text.
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2. The Recklessness Standard
In civil suits brought under rule 10b-5, reckless misconduct sup-
ports a finding of scienter,7 2 with recklessness defined as "highly unrea-
sonable" conduct involving "not merely simple, or even inexcusable
negligence, but an extreme departure from the standards of ordinary
care ... which presents a danger of misleading buyers or sellers that is
either known to the defendant or is so obvious that the actor must
have been aware of it.''73 This basic recklessness/scienter articulation
has been approved by a majority of the circuits.7 4 In the Fifth and
Eleventh Circuits the definition travels under the name "severe
recklessness."75
Despite courts having had decades to refine the culpability ele-
ment in 10b-5 cases, the federal precedent has been criticized for lack-
ing consistency:
Most federal circuits have approved some use of recklessness to
satisfy the scienter requirement in 10b-5 actions. There is little uni-
formity, however, among the circuits or even among different panels
of the same circuit, on how proof of recklessness should be used to
satisfy scienter. As one district court judge noted, the recklessness
footnote in Hochfelder "has served as a veritable quagmire for the
courts.
7 06
72. E.g., T. HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURTIES REGULATION, § 13.4, at 685-87 (2d ed.
1990).
73. Hollinger v. Titan Capital Corp., 914 F.2d 1564, 1569 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. de-
nied, 111 S. Ct. 1621 (1991) (quoting Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp., 553 F.2d
1033, 1045 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 875 (1977)). The Hollinger court quoted the
Sundstrand court's amplification of the standard: "[T]he danger of misleading buyers
must be actually known or so obvious that any reasonable man would be legally bound as
knowing, and the omission must derive from something more egregious than even 'white
heart/empty head' good faith." Id. at 1569-70 (footnotes omitted).
74. See, e.g., Hollinger, 914 F.2d at 1569 (9th Cir. 1990); Hackbart v. Holmes, 675
F.2d 1114, 1118 (10th Cir. 1982); SEC v. Carriba Air, Inc., 681 F.2d 1318, 1324 (11th Cir.
1982); Broad v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 642 F.2d 929, 961-62 (5th Cir. Apr.), cert. denied,
454 U.S. 965 (1981); McLean v. Alexander, 599 F.2d 1190, 1197-98 (3d Cir. 1979); Mans-
bach v. Prescott, Ball & Turben, 598 F.2d 1017, 1025 (6th Cir. 1979); Cook v. Avien, Inc.,
573 F.2d 685, 692 (lst Cir. 1978); Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co., 570 F.2d 38, 46-47
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1039 (1978); Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp., 553
F.2d 1033, 1045 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 875 (1977).
75. Shivangi v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 825 F.2d 885, 889 (5th Cir. 1987);
Woods v. Barnett Bank, 765 F.2d 1004, 1010 (11th Cir. 1985). Another name advocated
(without success) is "egregious recklessness." See In re Network Equip. Technologies,
Inc. Litig., 762 F. Supp. 1359, 1363 (N.D. Cal. 1991).
76. Milich, Securities Fraud Under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5: Scienter, Reck-
lessness, and the Good Faith Defense, 11 J. CORP. L. 179, 180 (1986) (quoting SEC v.
Pavo, 468 F. Supp. 635, 647 (N.D.N.Y. 1979)). The "recklessness footnote" in Ernst &
Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 n.12 (1976), reads in relevant part as follows:
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On the one hand, those forced to cope with uncertainty over 10b-5's
scienter element should not be disheartened. As noted below, criminal
law has been around for centuries, and there is still confusion over
where the boundary line for intent or knowledge should be fixed.7 7 On
the other hand, some discrepancies are developing about how courts
decide 10b-5 recklessness cases.
3. Altering the Culpability Standard Based on the Defendant's
Status
a. The Duty-to-Disclose Requirement in the Second and Seventh
Circuits
A growing number of courts have created a culpability formulation
in securities fraud aider and abettor cases, 78 requiring victims of securi-
ties fraud to establish a fiduciary relationship or similar relationship of
trust and confidence in order to hold the professional liable based on
reckless misconduct. Thus, in Ross v. Bolton 9 the Second Circuit held
that reckless misconduct would not suffice to establish scienter in a
10b-5 aider and abettor case absent a fiduciary relationship between
the plaintiff and the alleged aider and abettor.
In this opinion the term "scienter" refers to a mental state embracing intent to
deceive, manipulate, or defraud. In certain areas of the law recklessness is con-
sidered to be a form of intentional conduct for purposes of imposing liability
for some act. We need not address here the question whether, in some circum-
stances, reckless behavior is sufficient for civil liability under § 10(b) and Rule
10b-5.
77. See infra notes 199-258 and accompanying text.
78. According to the SEC:
In the context of the federal securities laws ... one may be found to have
aided and abetted a violation when the following three elements are present:
1. there exists an independent securities law violation committed by some
other party;
2. the aider and abettor knowingly and substantially assisted the conduct that
constitutes the violation; and
3. the aider and abettor was aware or knew that his role was part of an activity
that was improper or illegal.
In re Carter & Johnson, SEC Act Release No. 17,597 [1981 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 82,847, at 84,166 (Feb. 28, 1981).
79. 904 F.2d 819, 824 (2d Cir. 1990). See also Schatz v. Rosenberg, 943 F.2d 485
(4th Cir. 1991) (appearing to require a "duty running from the alleged aider and abettor
to the plaintiff" in order to find a recklessness scienter siandard); Edwards & Hanly v.
Wells Fargo Sec. Clearance Corp., 602 F.2d 478, 484 (2d Cir. 1979) ("The scienter re-
quirement scales upward when activity is more remote ... ."), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
1045 (1980); L. Loss, FuNDAmNrTALs OF SEculrins REGULATON 1185 (1983) (suggesting
that actual knowledge is required for secondary liability under Rule 10b-5).
1991]
19
Freeman and Crystal: Scienter in Professinal Liability Cases
Published by Scholar Commons, 2020
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REviEw
Showing that the alleged aider and abettor owed a duty to dis-
close, though not necessarily premised on a trust and confidence rela-
tionship, is now a featured requirement in 10b-5 aider and abettor
cases arising in the Seventh Circuit. In DiLeo v. Ernst & Young, 0 the
circuit court explained: "[T]here can be no liability on an aiding-and-
abetting theory unless (1) someone committed a primary violation, (2)
positive law obliges the abettor to disclose the truth, and (3) the abet-
tor fails to do this, with the same degree of scienter necessary for the
primary violation."81 Of course, if "positive law requires the abettor to
disclose the truth," then, if this is not done, the abettor is a "princi-
pal," or a primary wrongdoer. Exactly why it should be necessary to
establish that an aider and abettor is a primary wrongdoer, in order to
establish secondary liability, is something the Seventh Circuit has
failed to explain. Likewise, the Second Circuit has yet to explain why a
fraud victim should need to prove a breach of fiduciary duty case to
assert aider and abettor liability.
8 2
80. 901 F.2d 624 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 347 (1990).
81. Id. at 628.
82. The Seventh Circuit now has extended the requirement of a special showing for
secondary liability of professionals to conspiracy cases as well as aider and abettor cases.
In First Interstate Bank v. Chapman & Cutler, 837 F.2d 775 (7th Cir. 1988), the defend-
ant law firm gave an opinion to a county board, thereby satisfying a condition precedent
to the issuance of municipal bonds. The opinion, though important in facilitating the
transaction, was never seen or directly relied upon by public investors. The firm's opin-
ion was based on certain assumed facts "not consistent with the actual facts Chapman
and Cutler had learned earlier," id. at 777, with the result that the firm supposedly gave
an opinion resting on an assumption it knew to be false. The appellate court ruled for
the law firm on three grounds: (1) the proceeds of the offering were misapplied and this
constituted a superseding event, id. at 779-80; (2) no duty to disclose was breached, id. at
780 n.4; and (3) no allegation was made that the law firm agreed to a scheme to defraud
the bondholders. Id. at 780. If the firm had been communicating directly with the public,
the court would have had an easier time finding the breach of a duty to disclose. In any
event, the appellate court plainly was not sympathetic to the plaintiffs' conspiracy claim
against a large, distinguished local law firm:
The complaint is barren of any allegations that Chapman and Cutler actually
agreed to a scheme to defraud bond investors or facts from which such agree-
ment could be reasonably inferred. Conclusory assertions that Chapman and
Cutler was "engaged in a fraudulent common plan" are simply not enough.
Dismissal of a complaint containing only conclusory, vague, and general allega-
tions of conspiracy is proper.
Id, (footnote omitted) (emphasis in original).
The law firm gave a "necessary" professional opinion, id. at 777, which included
assumptions it knew to be false. If this does not raise an inference of knowing participa-
tion in fraud, then what would? If a lawyer "cannot counsel others to make statements
in the face of obvious indications of which he is aware that those assertions are not true,"
United States v. Sarantos, 455 F.2d 877, 881 (2d Cir. 1972), then why may a lawyer make
statements like those made in Chapman & Cutler with impunity?
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b. The Fifth Circuit's Sliding Scale Approach
The Second and the Seventh Circuits are not alone in striving to
protect wayward professionals. A Fifth Circuit case exemplifying the
same sort of pro-defense leaning found in the Second and Seventh Cir-
cuits is Abell v. Potomac Insurance Co.83 In Abell, the court reversed a
jury verdict returned against the underwriter's counsel based on Sec-
tion 12, Rule 10b-5, the Louisiana Blue Sky Law, negligent misrepre-
sentation, common-law fraud, legal malpractice, breach of fiduciary
duty, and statutory aider and abettor liability under state law. In so
holding, the appeals court manifested extreme protectiveness toward
lawyers caught up in a financial debacle.
The plaintiffs in Abell were victims of a municipal bond swindle.
The defendant lawyers had served as counsel to the underwriter. The
jury verdict against the law firm was supported by expert testimony,
apparently credited on appeal, that the firm "failed seriously in its due
diligence duties to investigate the bond transaction,""M and the court
conceded that the firm "recklessly disregarded its duties to its cli-
ents. ' 85 The court rejected plaintiffs' contention that aider and abettor
liability applied, finding that although the firm's services had assisted
the fraud, and although the firm had "ignored several warning signs
that the jury could have found aroused the law firm to suspect the
propriety of the offering,"8 it still was not generally aware of its role in
furthering a fraudulent scheme, and had not given knowing assis-
tance.87 In holding that scienter had not been shown, the Fifth Circuit
embraced a chameleon-like scienter element that changes color de-
pending on where in the scheme the alleged wrongdoer is situated. The
Abell court embraced "a single test for scienter that varies as the level
of assistance decreases on a slidihg scale from recklessness to 'con-
scious intent.' "88
Significantly, the court in Abell differentiated the exposure faced
by the defendant law firm, which had functioned as underwriters'
counsel in the bond offering, from the exposure of lawyers who render
opinions to third parties, including bond counsel.8 9 The court clearly
considered that bond counsel run a greater risk of liability to investors
than do underwriters' counsel. 0 Here, as in the Second Circuit's fiduci-
83. 858 F.2d 1104 (5th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 918 (1989).
84. Id. at 1111.
85. Id. at 1128.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 1126-27.
88. Id. at 1127.
89. Id. at 1125-26.
90. In noting that the fir had "failed to investigate properly the truth of the of-
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ary duty line of cases, the standard for mental state was adjusted
based on the defendant's physical nexus to the injured party.
All other things being equal, it is hard to fathom why underwrit-
ers' counsel deserve a more forgiving scienter standard than bond
counsel. The reason either group of lawyers is hired is to produce an
honest offering document that protects the interests of all concerned.
Underwriters' counsel cannot protect their clients and, at the same
time, disregard the interests of investors. Underwriters' counsel pro-
vide protection for the underwriters through the exercise of due dili-
gence in favor of investors. After all, the most worrisome legal risk fac-
ing the underwriters in an offering is that the investors will be misled
and sue.
Far less generous to underwriters' counsel than Abell was the dis-
trict court in In re Flight Transportation Corp. Securities Litigation.91
The court upheld 10b-5 claims against lawyers for the underwriter who
participated in preparing the offering document, as did the lawyers in
Abell.92 The lawyers were charged with, among other things, having ac-
ted in reckless disregard of the facts,93 (precisely what was proved, to
no avail, in Abell). Likewise, in 1989, a Second Circuit panel affirmed
per curiam in SEC v. Calvo5 4 the "comprehensive, well reasoned, re-
ported opinion"95 of the district court in SEC v. Electronics Ware-
house, Inc9 6 The lower court expressly had found that an under-
writer's counsel who drafted documents that foreseeably would be
relied on by the investing public owed a duty to the investing public,
and that, in this context, recklessness equalled scienter for aider and
abettor liability. Calvo thus clashes with Abell's holdings on the duty-
owed and scienter issues. It clashes as well with the current vogue in
the Second Circuit to elevate the scienter standard when the alleged
aider and abettor lacks a fiduciary tie to the victim.
c. The Fourth Circuit's Position in Schatz v. Rosenberg
Though Abell is a startling decision, it pales in comparison to the
Fourth Circuit's August 1991 opinion announcing its entry into the
ranks of circuit courts sympathetic to professional defendants. The
fering statement," id. at 1127, the court took pains to "re-emphasize that [the law firm's]
duty ran to its clients, not to the bondholders." Id. n.24.
91. 593 F. Supp. 612 (D. Mim. 1984).
92. Abell, 858 F.2d at 1127.
93. Flight Trans., 593 F. Supp. at 617.
94. 891 F.2d 457 (2d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 3228 (1990).
95. Id. at 458.
96. 689 F. Supp. 53 (D. Conn. 1988), aff'd sub nom. SEC v. Calvo, 891 F.2d 457
(1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 3228 (1990).
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case is Schatz v. Rosenberg, 7 a fraud suit based on a close corporation
buyout. The defendant law firm of Weinberg & Green represented the
buyer who agreed to pay $1.5 million for eighty percent of the stock in
two companies held by Mr. and Mrs. Schatz, the plaintiffs. The sale
was to MER Enterprises, a shell company controlled by Rosenberg. In
return for their control stock, plaintiffs received a note for the $1.5
million guaranteed by Rosenberg. The complaint alleged that the
Schatzes relied on Rosenberg's financial statement dated March 31,
1986, and an update letter dated December 31, 1986, showing that Ro-
senberg had a net worth of $7 million. In fact, the documents con-
tained material misrepresentations "obscuring the fact that Rosen-
berg's financial empire had crumbled between April and December of
1986."' s Weinberg & Green represented Rosenberg and his entities
throughout this period.
Weinberg & Green had received a copy of Rosenberg's financial
statement, and the firm allegedly knew of its falsity as a result of legal
services provided to Rosenberg in the past. Despite this alleged knowl-
edge, the firm prepared documents for the closing, including a clause in
the purchase agreement "stating that Rosenberg had delivered his 1986
financial statement and an update letter to the plaintiffs, and that the
letters were accurate in all material respects." 99 At closing the firm de-
livered the fraudulent update letter and participated in the closing of
the transaction. Subsequently, Rosenberg looted the assets of the ac-
quired companies to prop up his failing businesses. Weinberg & Green
was paid for its help in making the deal possible out of the cash
reserves of the acquired companies. Roughly ten months later, Rosen-
berg and his operation were in bankruptcy and the companies that
plaintiffs sold had been rendered worthless. Unlike Weinberg & Green,
Mr. and Mrs. Schatz were never paid. In fact, they lost an additional
$150,000 for a bridge loan they had made to one of Rosenberg's compa-
nies. They sued the lawyers, asserting theories under basic agency law
concepts, Maryland common law, as well under Rule 10b-5.100 In af-
firming a motion to dismiss, the Fourth Circuit held that under no set
of facts could plaintiffs possibly recover under any asserted state or
federal theory.
The court's treatment of aider and abettor liability is indicative of
the opinion's harsh anti-investor, pro-professional tone. Relying on
cases from the Second and Fifth Circuits, the court adopted a height-
ened scienter standard for aider and abettor liability:
97. 943 F.2d 485 (4th Cir. 1991).
98. Id. at 488.
99. Id. at 489.
100. Id. at 488.
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[A]n evaluation of the "knowledge" requirement of the aiding and
abetting liability test turns upon whether the aider and abettor de-
fendant owed a duty to the plaintiff. When there is no duty running
from the alleged aider and abettor to the plaintiff, the defendant must
possess a "high conscious intent" and a "conscious and specific moti-
vation" to aid the fraud.
101
The Fourth Circuit further tightened the requirements for aider and
abettor liability by strictly limiting the definition of "substantial assis-
tance." According to the court, "the lawyer must actively participate in
soliciting sales or negotiating terms of the deal on behalf of a client to
have 'substantially assisted' a securities violation."' 2 Preparation, dis-
semination, and presiding over the use of documents containing fraud-
ulent misstatements was not enough assistance.
The court's treatment of aider and abettor liability under agency
law shows a similar, extreme, pro-professional attitude. Plaintiffs had
contended that under Restatement (Second) of Agency section 348,
"an agent who . . . knowingly assists in the commission of a tortious
fraud . . . by his principal . . . is subject to liability in tort to the in-
jured person although the fraud. . . occurs in a transaction on behalf
of the principal."'01 3 This agency principle clearly is on point. Weinberg
& Green served Rosenberg as his agent. If, as alleged, the law firm,
through its lawyers, "knowingly assisted" the fraud perpetrated by its
principal, then, under section 348, the law firm was culpable.
The Fourth Circuit panel dealt with plaintiffs' section 348 argu-
ment the only way it could and still find for Weinberg & Green as a
matter of law: evasion. The court first explained that "the fact that an
attorney is an agent. . . does not automatically make the attorney lia-
ble under agency law for misrepresentations his client makes."'01 4 This
is true enough. However, it is does not address section 348. The section
does not impose strict liability or vicarious liability on the agent. The
section attacks agents who "knowingly assist" their principal's frauds,
which is what Weinberg & Green allegedly did.
The court then explained that "lawyers do not vouch for the pro-
bity of their clients when they draft documents reflecting their clients'
promises, statements, or warranties. '"10 6 This also is true. But it does
not follow that lawyers are privileged knowingly to further their cli-
ents' frauds in drafting, transmitting, and presiding over the use of
those documents. In any event, "vouching" is not essential to liability
101. Id. at 496.
102. Id. at 497.
103. Id. at 494 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 348 (1957)).
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under section 348. Liability attaches based on knowing assistance,
whether or not any communication is made.
Next, the court explained that "Weinberg & Green's alleged trans-
mission of Rosenberg's misrepresentations does not transform those
misrepresentations into the representations of Weinberg & Green."' 10
This is also true. But, again, it evades the point of section 348, which is
that connivance in the principal's fraud by an agent is actionable. In
answer to plaintiff's very solid (if not unanswerable) agency law argu-
ment, the court basically filibustered, holding
that a lawyer or law firm cannot be liable for the representations of a
client, even if the lawyer incorporates the client's misrepresentations
into legal documents or agreements necessary for closing the transac-
tions. In this case, Weinberg & Green merely "papered the deal," that
is, put into writing the terms on which the Schatzes and Rosenberg
agreed and prepared the documents necessary for closing the transac-
tions. Thus, Weinberg & Green performed the role of a scrivener.
Under these circumstances, a law firm cannot be held liable for mis-
representations made by a client in a financial disclosure document.
0 7
Unquestionably Schatz is an extreme case. The Fourth Circuit, al-
ready known for its aversion to 10b-5 civil suits,108 quite simply has
created virtual immunity under common law and the federal securities
laws for lawyers who knowingly further their clients' investment
frauds, so long as counsel have the good sense not to personally sign a
fraudulent opinion letter addressed to the victim. Moreover, the
Fourth Circuit's safe harbor for the reckless may even be capacious
enough to shelter wayward. accountants who sign opinion letters in con-
junction with their audits. As an example of Schatz's zealous pro-de-
fense orientation, consider that the Fourth Circuit took time to imply
that a company's auditors might well likewise have immunity if they
discovered and failed to do anything about client fraud.0 9
106. Id.
107. Id. The Fourth Circuit brushed aside plaintiffs' citation of agency cases involv-
ing fraudulent assistance by a banker and a realtor on the ground that they were "inap-
posite" because they did not involve lawyers. Id. n.4. Clearly, the Fourth Circuit viewed
lawyer-agents as privileged to assist frauds knowingly while others in the economy do not
enjoy this privilege. The equal protection aspects of this discrimination were not
discussed.
108. E.g., Hunt v. Robinson, 852 F.2d 786, 787-88 (4th Cir. 1988) (opinion by Judge
Wilkinson, joined in by Judge Chapman, both panel members in Schatz, announcing
"the goal [of § 10(b)] is not furthered by bringing within the ambit of § 10(b) claims
amounting to ... common law fraud which have long been the staples of state law.").
But see Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 234-35 (1980) ("Section 10(b) is aptly
described as a catchall provision but what it catches must be fraud." (emphasis added)).
109. Schatz, 943 F.2d at 493-94. The Fourth Circuit did this by quoting with evi-
dent approval the language from DiLeo v. Ernst & Young, 901 F.2d 624, 629 (7th Cir.),
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4. Difficulties Raised by Emerging Scienter Approaches
Schatz and the other pro-professional cases discussed in this sub-
section raise serious problems. One set of problems pertains to concep-
tual difficulties caused by the irrationality of conflicting standards. The
root of this category of problems is judicial inconsistency. A second set
of problems is of a practical nature. Courts will not find it easy to ap-
ply the sliding scale or multitier scienter standards engrafted onto the
federal common law of 10b-5. Finally, there is the inevitable problem
of justifying protecting reckless professionals as sound public policy.
These three problem areas are discussed below.
a. Irrationality and Inconsistency
Historically, the common law took a dim view of those who know-
ingly assisted frauds, as illustrated by section 876 of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts and section 348 of the Restatement (Second) of
Agency. Section 312 of the Restatement (Second) of Agency likewise
condemns to joint and several liability those who would intentionally
cause or assist an agent to breach a duty to his or her principal. Even
the prolawyer holding by California's Supreme Court in Doctors' Co. is
more balanced than Schatz and Abell. The California court, after all,
was willing to presume that lawyers who knowingly participate in ac-
tual fraud would have coequal responsibility with their
coparticipants.110
One way to justify departure from basic, well-established norms is
to take the view that lawyers (and, perhaps accountants) deserve bet-
ter treatment than run-of-the-mill agents. Thus, in Schatz, we find the
court distinguishing cases in which bankers and realtors had been held
liable for conduct as agents."" In the eyes of the Schatz court, it seems
that lawyers deserve greater leeway in furthering frauds than lesser
breeds of agents. But this sort of line-drawing is arbitrary. Where in
the common law do we find the notion that lawyer-agents are privi-
leged to assist frauds knowingly above other agents? From what ac-
cepted source do we draw authorization for this preferential treatment
lawyers receive?
The criminal law does not protect from culpability lawyers who
knowingly further frauds. The notion that connivers enjoy a height-
ened intent standard compared to primary wrongdoers was rejected by
cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 347 (1990). See infra note 129 and accompanying text.
110. See Doctors' Co., 49 Cal. 3d 39, 48, 775 P.2d 508, 513, 260 Cal. Rptr. 183, 188.
111. Schatz, 943 F.2d at 495 n.4.
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the Supreme Court in United States v. Feola.112 The Model Penal
Code is in accord:
When causing a particular result is an element of an offense, an
accomplice in the conduct causing such result is an accomplice in the
commission of that offense if he acts with the kind of culpability, if
any, with respect to the result that is sufficient for the commission of
the offense. 113
In fact, the Fourth Circuit in Schatz and other activist courts ap-
pear to be establishing a higher scienter level in civil damage suits than
applies in criminal cases. Both lawyers 1"4 and accountants' 15 have been
found guilty of criminal violations under a recklessness culpability
standard, without a requirement that the prosecution make a special
showing of "severe recklessness" or "high conscious intent."16
112. 420 U.s. 684, 686-88 (1975).
113. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06(4) (1985). Accomplices generally must act with "the
purpose of promoting or facilitating the commission of the offense," id. § 2.06(3)(a), but
"often, if not usually, aid rendered with guilty knowledge implies purpose since it has no
other motivation." MODEL PENAL CODE & COMmNTARImS § 2.06 comment c, at 316
(1985). "Guilty knowledge" under criminal law principles, including those propounded in
the Model Penal Code, is a fairly elastic concept, with both the "common law position"
and the Model Penal Code's being that reckless misconduct generally suffices to establish
criminal culpability. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(3) (1985); MODEL PENAL CODE &
CoMMENTARms § 2.02(3), comment 5, at 244 (1985).
114. E.g., United States v. Frank, 520 F.2d 1287 (2d Cir. 1975) (conviction of securi-
ties lawyer for conspiracy to violate the securities laws in connection with an initial pub-
lic offering), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1087 (1976); United States v. Persky, 520 F.2d 283 (2d
Cir. 1975) (conviction for publishing false statements in violation of rule 10b-5); United
States v. Benjamin, 328 F.2d 854 (2d Cir.) (conviction of attorney and accountant for
violating the Securities Act of 1933 and the Mail Fraud Statute), cert. denied, 377 U.S.
953 (1964).
115. United States v. Natelli, 527 F.2d 311 (2d Cir. 1975) (accountant conviction in
connection with securities fraud), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 934 (1976); United States v.
Simon, 425 F.2d 796 (2d Cir. 1969) (accountants convicted for issuing audit opinion in
violation of Mail Fraud and False Statement Statute and securities laws), cert. denied,
397 U.S. 1006 (1970).
116. In United States v. Sarantos, 455 F.2d 877 (2d Cir. 1972) the scienter instruc-
tion defined "knowingly and wilfully as meaning that 'one knows what he or she is doing,
as distinguished from an inadvertent or careless act"' and directed that the jury could
conclude Sarantos "acted with reckless disregard of whether the statements made were
true or with a conscious effort to avoid learning the trth... even though you may find
he was not specifically aware of the facts which would establish the falsity of the state-
ments." Id. at 880. In United States v. Hester, 880 F.2d 799 (4th Cir. 1989), the Fourth
Circuit held that "actual" knowledge was not needed to support a criminal conviction
under 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(6) (making a false statement in connection with the acquisition
of a firearm). All that was needed was to make a statement with "a deliberate disregard
for its truth or falsity with a conscious purpose to avoid learning the truth." Hester, 880
-F.2d at 802. Sarantos was quoted with approval for the proposition that criminal sanc-
tions could not be avoided by the wrongdoer's "merely closing his eyes to the obvious
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Comparison of Schatz with SEC enforcement actions also demon-
strates inconsistency in the treatment of professional conduct. SEC
case law has held that attorneys with knowledge of securities law viola-
tions by their clients cannot continue their representation in the nor-
mal course, but must instead take some action, such as withdrawing
from representation. 1 7 Does it make sense for the very same conduct
to be immune from civil liability while being subject to injunctive ac-
tion or disciplinary sanction by the SEC? Or are cases like Schatz in
fact overruling sub silentio established SEC precedent? It is impossible
to square Schatz with the Second Circuit's ruling in SEC v. Calvol
and the lower court decision Calvo affirmed.
Another anomaly created by Schatz and similar cases is that pro-
fessionals now enjoy an immunity from liability exceeding even that of
the managers they serve. Under the business judgment rule,11 9 corpo-
rate officers are relieved of liability for good faith errors of judgment.
The common-law business judgment rule has never protected manag-
ers from reckless conduct, an immunity Schatz decrees should be given
to reckless outside counsel.
b. Practical Problems Abound
Practical difficulties are raised by the tendency to bend the rules
risk he is engaging in unlawful conduct." Id. The Fourth Circuit did not mention Hester
or Sarantos in Schatz. For discussion of culpability standards under the criminal law,
see infra notes 199-294 and accompanying text.
117. SEC v. National Student Mktg. Corp., 457 F. Supp. 682 (D.D.C. 1978) (liability
based on furthering fraudulent proxy solicitation); SEC v. National Student Mktg. Corp.,
402 F. Supp. 641 (D.D.C. 1975) (denying summary judgment sought by a lawyer who
claimed to have given a technically correct legal opinion; the court held that even if this
were true, the SEC still would not be foreclosed from establishing aider and abettor
liability); In re Carter & Johnson, SEC Act Release No. 17,597 [1981 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) T 82,847, at 84,166 (Feb. 28, 1981).
118. 891 F.2d 457 (2d Cir. 1989), aff'g SEC v. Electronics Warehouse, Inc., 689 F.
Supp. 53 (D. Conn. 1988), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 3228 (1990). See supra notes 94-96 and
accompanying text.
119. The business judgment rule creates a safe harbor for errors of judgment made
in good faith by corporate directors. The rule provides a useful analogue for the solici-
tousness shown errant opiners through the privity defense. Under the business judgment
rule, directors are protected from liability unless they have acted illegally, in bad faith,
engaged in fraud or self-dealing, or were guilty of gross negligence. See Smith v. Van
Gorlom, 488 A.2d 858, 872-73 (Del. 1985) (discussing the business judgment rule and
confirming that "the concept of gross negligence" embodies the proper standard of care
for corporate directors). The business judgment rule "is a presumption that in making a
business decision the directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith
and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the company."
Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. Super. Ct. 1984).
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for professionals. Applying a sliding scale of scienter in a fraud case
based on a securities offering, as the Fifth Circuit did in Abell, opens
up all sorts of unresolved issues. In a real estate limited partnership
offering, for example, who has a higher culpability standard: issuer's
counsel, underwriters' counsel, the CPAs, the firm writing the tax opin-
ion, or the firm that rendered the MAI appraisal? Does the scienter
standard for issuer's counsel change if one of the lawyers is also a di-
rector for the issuer? Do the issuer's directors themselves have differ-
ing scienter standards depending on whether they are insiders? Does
their scienter standard vary depending on how long they have served
on the board? Does the lawyer for the issuer who is in charge of the
engagement have a different scienter standard from the lawyer's junior
partners and associates who lend important assistance? 120 In a bond
offering, where would the indenture trustee or bond counsel fit into
this roving-scienter-standard system? Do they deserve a higher or
lower culpability standard than the managing underwriter, other un-
derwriters, or underwriters' counsel? On what principled basis?
The sliding scale of scienter embraced by the Fifth Circuit in Abell
will be very cumbersome and difficult to apply in practice. If ambiguity
is so helpful, one wonders why the Ninth Circuit recently abandoned
its "flexible duty" scienter standard in favor of a generic recklessness
definition.121 This is not to say it makes more sense to go the way of
jurisdictions such as the Second and Fourth Circuits that pivot the sci-
enter standard on the existence of a fiduciary relationship between the
fraud victim and the aider and abettor. For one thing, determining ex-
actly when a fiduciary relationship exists is not always easy. For exam-
ple, is a close corporation's or partnership's counsel in a fiduciary rela-
tionship with shareholders or partners? How about subscribers?
Furthermore, Schatz suggests that a confidential relationship1 22 is the
120. Clearly, the lawyer's status within the firm may be important in deciding
whether his or her conduct should be imputed to the firm. See In re Rospatch See. Litig.,
760 F. Supp. 1239, 1250 (W.D. Mich. 1991).
121. Hollinger v. Titan Capital Corp., 914 F.2d 1564 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied,
111 S. Ct. 1621 (1991). In Hollinger the Ninth Circuit abandoned the "flexible duty" test
announced in White v. Abrams, 495 F.2d 724, 735-36 (9th Cir. 1974). The "flexible duty"
test required courts to consider the following factors: (1) the relationship of defendant to
plaintiff; (2) defendant's access to the information as compared to that of plaintiff; (3)
defendant's benefit derived from the relationship; (4) defendant's awareness of whether
plaintiff was relying on their relationship in making his or her investment decisions; and
(5) defendant's activity in initiating the transaction in question. Zweig v. Hearst Corp.,
594 F.2d 1261, 1268 (9th Cir. 1979).
122. According to BLACK'S LAW DIcTIoNARY 298 (6th ed. 1990), a confidential rela-
tion is a broad category.
A fiduciary relation. It is a peculiar relation which exists between client
and attorney, principal and agent, principal and surety, landlord and tenant,
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practical equivalent of a fiduciary relationship for purposes of setting
the scienter standard. However, the existence of a confidential relation
between parties can often be a hotly disputed issue. Thus, in many
cases fact questions pertaining to the existence of a trust and confi-
dence relationship will need to be resolved at trial as part of the scien-
ter determination.
c. Important Policy Questions Have Been Inadequately Addressed
Schatz and the other cases upholding a recklessness-plus standard
are dead wrong as a matter of policy. Analysis of the issue of the scope
of professional liability for involvement in client fraud requires a bal-
anced consideration of the policies supporting limitation of profes-
sional liability and the public interest in the integrity of securities
transactions.
Pro-professional courts have articulated two policies as the bases
for limiting liability of professionals in securities transactions: fear of
unlimited liability imposed on the honest professional and concern
about maintenance of client confidences. The first policy was articu-
lated by Judge Cardozo in Ultramares Corp. v. Touche.12 3 Cardozo re-
fused to extend liability of professionals for negligent performance of a
professional contract beyond the professional's employer to third par-
ties. Cardozo carefully limited his decision to negligence; therefore, lia-
bility to third parties would exist when the professional engaged in
fraud, including reckless conduct:
Our holding does not emancipate accountants from the conse-
quences of fraud. It does not relieve them if their audit has been so
negligent as to justify a finding that they had no genuine belief in its
adequacy, for this again is fraud. It does no more than say that, if less
parent and child, guardian and ward, ancestor and heir, husband and wife,
trustee and cestui que trust, executors or administrators and creditors, lega-
tees, or distributees, appointor and appointee under powers, and partners and
part owners. In these and like cases, the law, in order to prevent undue advan-
tage from the unlimited confidence or sense of duty which the relation natu-
rally creates, requires the utmost degree of good faith in all transactions be-
tween the parties. It is not confined to any specific association of parties. It
appears when the circumstances make it certain that the parties do not deal on
equal terms, but on the one side there is an overmastering influence, or, on the
other, weakness, dependence, or trust, justifiably reposed. The mere existence
of kinship does not, of itself, give rise to such relation. It covers every form of
relation between parties wherein confidence is reposed by one in another, and
[the] former relies and acts upon representations of the other and is guilty of
no derelictions on his own part. Peckham v. Johnson, Tex. Civ. App., 98
S.W.2d 408, 416.
123. 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931).
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than this is proved, if there has been neither reckless misstatement
nor insincere profession of an opinion, but only honest blunder, the
ensuing liability for negligence is one that is bounded by the contract,
and is to be enforced between the parties by whom the contract has
been made. We doubt whether the average business man receiving a
certificate without paying for it, and receiving it merely as one among
a multitude of possible investors, would look for anything more.
12
4
Manipulation of the scienter element in fraud cases by an activist
judiciary for social engineering purposes was never advocated by Judge
Cardozo. He never suggested that professionals who act recklessly or
worse are worthy of special protection. In fact, he rejected the notion.
Cardozo equated reckless misconduct with fraudulent intent.125 Yet,
the cases discussed in this section have produced precisely the result
Cardozo would not countenance: immunity for recklessness absent
some special relationship between the professional and the victim.
The second policy basis for limiting professional liability-concern
about protecting client confidences-was expressed by the Fourth Cir-
cuit in Schatz v. Rosenberg:
Any other result may prevent a client from reposing complete trust in
his lawyer for fear that he might reveal a fact which would trigger the
lawyer's duty to the third party. Similarly, if attorneys had a duty to
disclose information to third parties, attorneys would have an incen-
tive not to press clients for information. The net result would not be
less securities fraud. Instead, attorneys would more often be unwitting
accomplices to the fraud as a result of being kept in the dark by their
clients or by their own reluctance to obtain information. The better
rule-that attorneys have no duty to "blow the whistle" on their cli-
ents-allows clients to repose complete trust in their lawyers. Under
those circumstances, the client is more likely to disclose damaging or
problematic information, and the lawyer will more likely be able to
counsel his client against misconduct.12
124. Id. at 189, 174 N.E. at 448.
125. See Harper Tax Servs. v. Quick Tax Ltd., 686 F. Supp. 109, 114 (D. Md. 1988):
[A]llegations of either intentional or reckless misstatements state an action for
fraud or deceit. The leading New York case, Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 255
N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931), resisted a trend to recognize parallel negligence
and fraud actions by accepting a broader view of the latter: 'Fraud includes the
pretense of knowledge when knowledge there is none... . If such a statement
was made, whether believed to be true or not, the defendants are liable for
deceit in the event that it was false.' Id. at 179-80, 174 N.E. at 444. "Even the
narrowest holdings as to liability for unintentional misstatement concede that
a representation in such circumstances may be equivalent to a warranty." Id.
at 183, 174 N.E. at 446.
Id.
126. 943 F.2d 485, 493 (4th Cir. 1991).
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The Seventh Circuit in DiLeo v. Ernst & Young"2 7 expressed simi-
lar concerns about requiring auditors to "blow the whistle on improper
behavior by their clients.'
128
Such a duty would prevent the client from reposing in the accountant
the trust that is essential to an accurate audit. Firms would withhold
documents, allow auditors to see but not copy, and otherwise emulate
the CIA, if they feared that access might lead to destructive disclo-
sure-for even an honest firm may fear that one of its accountant's
many auditors would misunderstand the situation and ring the tocsin
needlessly, with great loss to the firm.129
Protecting attorney-client privileged communications is not a le-
gitimate concern in cases where a prima facie case can be made that
the lawyer's services have been used to further a fraud. Courts consist-
ently have recognized that the attorney-client privilege is limited by a
"crime-fraud exception," making it inapplicable where the lawyer's
consultation assists the client in committing a continuing or future
crime, fraud, or other misconduct, 130 or in obstructing discovery of a
past fraud.131 The policy underlying the crime-fraud exception was ex-
plained by the Second Circuit:
The rationale for the exclusion is closely tied to the policies underly-
ing these privileges. Whereas confidentiality of communications and
127. 901 F.2d 624 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 347 (1990).
128. Id. at 629.
129. Id. History has shown that accountants' clients bent on perpetrating financial
fraud have long been prone to use clandestine tactics, including withholding documents
"and otherwise emulat[ing] the CIA," which is why auditors exist in the first place. A
client who prevented its accounting firm from conducting the audit in accordance with
generally accepted accounting standards would receive an opinion qualified as to scope, a
red flag itself, full of meaning to creditors and regulatory agencies, including the SEC. In
United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 819 (1984), the Supreme Court unani-
mously rejected the argument that accountants were entitled to special preferential
treatment (protection of tax accrual work papers from IRS scrutiny) premised on the
fear that absent special protection "a corporation might be tempted to withhold from its
auditor certain information relevant and material to a proper evaluation of its financial
statements." Id. at 818. DiLeo thus simply recycles the already discredited argument
that if auditors do what they are expected to do-audit diligently and report fairly and
hone3tly-the system will somehow suffer grave injury. Schatz recycles the infirm argu-
ment packaged in pro-lawyer verbiage.
130. See, e.g., In re Sealed Case, 754 F.2d 395, 399 (D.C. Cir. 1985); In re Special
September 1978 Grand Jury (II), 640 F.2d 49, 59 (7th Cir. 1980); United States v. Al-
dridge, 484 F.2d 655, 658 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 921 (1974); Sound Video
Unlimited, Inc. v. Video Shack, Inc., 661 F. Supp. 1482 (N.D. IlM. 1987). See generally
Developments in the Law-Privileged Communications, 98 HARv. L. REv. 1450, 1509-14
(1985).
131. See, e.g., In re John Doe Corp., 675 F.2d 482, 491 (2d Cir. 1982); Grand Jury
(H), 640 F.2d at 60-61.
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work product facilitates the rendering of sound legal advice, advice in
furtherance of a fraudulent or unlawful goal cannot be considered
"sound." Rather advice in furtherance of such goals is socially per-
verse, and the client's communications seeking such advice are not
worthy of protection. 13 2
If rendering advice in furtherance of a client's fraud is socially per-
verse, what can be said about a lawyer's knowingly assisting the fraud
by papering the deal and splitting the proceeds with the client? Thus,
one problem with the confidentiality concern raised in the cases is that
confidentiality never has been protected where the lawyer's employ-
ment is an essential link in the fraudulent scheme.
Moreover, the professed confidentiality concerns miss the point
when the basis of liability asserted against the professional is knowing
or reckless assistance in fraud rather than primary liability for failure
to blow the whistle. Even if one accepts the proposition that the securi-
ties laws do not impose direct liability for failure to disclose informa-
tion absent a fiduciary duty or similar duty of trust and confidence,
133
this doctrine does not justify connivance. Confidences can be main-
tained without complicity if professionals follow a simple formula when
confronted with client fraud: counsel against the fraud, then withdraw
if necessary.1
3 4
Missing from Schatz is any cogent explanation how the policy bal-
ance struck tilts in society's best interest. Exactly what societal value is
served by permitting professionals, holding monopoly licenses and
sworn to serve in the public interest, to knowingly or recklessly aid
their corrupt clients in fleecing innocent reliant parties? If lawyers are
privileged knowingly or recklessly to prepare and present fraudulent
financial documents used to dupe private investors, then what about
when the recipients are federal banks or government agencies? Exactly
what longstanding, honorable precept of the legal profession is served
by allowing its members to knowingly or recklessly further frauds per-
petrated on innocent investors? How does the protection from account-
ability given reckless lawyers who aid frauds on public investors com-
pare with the high level of professionalism and accountability federal
judges demand from those same lawyers as evidenced by Rule 11?1
3 5
132. In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated September 15, 1983, 731 F.2d
1032, 1038 (2d Cir. 1984).
133. The Supreme Court accepted this view in Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S.
222 (1980).
134. See SEC v. National Student Mktg. Corp., 457 F. Supp. 682 (D.D.C. 1978);
SEC v. National Student Mktg. Corp., 402 F. Supp. 641 (D.D.C. 1975); In re Carter &
Johnson, SEC Act Release No. 17,597 [1981 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
82,847, at 84,166 (Feb. 28, 1981).
135. FED. R. Cirv. P. 11.
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How does immunizing knowing or reckless assistance to fraudulent
conduct, the precise misconduct condemned in numerous leading se-
curities cases, 138 enhance either confidence in America's capital mar-
kets or the public's trust in the legal profession?
Another serious public policy problem surfaces once courts seek to
protect miscreants toiling within the workings of complex fraudulent
schemes. Fraudulent schemes outlawed by both RICO and 10b-5 can
assume enormous size. The truly large ones tend to be hatched or fur-
thered by those who operate out of the individual investors' view. Con-
sequently, the more emphasis placed on the defendant's physical con-
tacts or direct dealings or trust and confidential relationship with the
plaintiff in a case attacking a fraudulent scheme, the greater the likeli-
hood that scienter will be hardest to show where proving it is most
important: in the truly massive, complicated, nationwide scam having
layers of wrongdoers and hundreds or thousands of injured investors.
137
As the size of the swindle, and hence its viciousness, escalates, the
physical contacts between victims and those in control are apt to de-
crease or be nonexistent. Is it reasonable to insist in such cases that, as
the contacts between victims and miscreants diminish or disappear,
the victim's burden of proof on intent ought to rise to the level of prac-
tical impossibility?
d. Summary
The Second, Fourth, Fifth, and Seventh Circuits are leading the
way toward formulation of an extremely high culpability standard ap-
plicable to white collar fraud participants who "merely 'papered the
136. E.g., United States v. Frank, 520 F.2d 1287 (2d Cir. 1975) (conviction of securi-
ties lawyer for conspiracy to violate the securities laws in connection with an initial pub-
lic offering), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1087 (1976); United States v. Persky, 520 F.2d 283 (2d
Cir. 1975) (conviction for publishing false statements in violation of Rule 10b-5); United
States v. Benjamin, 328 F.2d 854 (2d Cir.) (convictions for violating the Securities Act of
1933 and the mail fraud statute), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 953 (1964). See also supra note
115.
137. For example, in Faircloth v. Finesod, 938 F.2d 513 (4th Cir. 1991), the court
dealt with an "art master scam," id. at 515 n.2, involving 2000 sales of fraudulent tax
shelters, that generated "$409 million in notes receivable from buyers of art masters." Id.
at 514. The art master company, Jackie Fine Arts, Inc., was wholly owned by a holding
company that was in turn wholly owned by the fraud's promoter, Herman Finesod. The
holding company's 1986 tax return showed assets of $1.33 billion. Id. at 514 n.1. In a
huge fraudulent scheme like this, what is the likelihood that a particular investor will be
in actual contractual privity with, or specifically rely on, or even know the names of
those professionals working for the promoter who are instrumental in bringing the scam
to fruition? Why should the promoter's lawyers, who operate anonymously behind the
scenes as the legal architects of the scheme, be held to a more relaxed scienter standard
than the firm that writes the tax shelter opinion packaged in the sales literature?
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deal,' '"138 however cunning and fraudulent that deal may be.
Fabrication of a higher culpability standard translates as well into tol-
erance, if not outright approval, of a lower standard of professional be-
havior. The reckless professional, if not applauded, is at least
protected.
Insofar as there is a tendency, however insupportable, to raise cul-
pability standards when professionals are attacked by use of aider and
abettor or co-conspirator allegations, there is an obvious alternative.
The alternative is to not sue based on a theory of indirect liability, but
to sue the professional as a direct participant in a fraudulent scheme.
Rule 10b-5's text, clearly supports this tack since it outlaws not just
making material misrepresentations and omissions, but also employing
"any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud," and engaging in "any act
or practice or course of business which operates or would operate as a
fraud or deceit upon any person."'139 The rule's wording certainly does
not condone a lawyer's preparation and participation in the use of
fraudulent documents created to facilitate the purchase of a company's
control stock. Nor does the rule's language require that the 10b-5 viola-
tor communicate directly with the victim, though conservative courts
bent on truncating the rule's reach have so interpreted it.
140 Civil
RICO likewise has no written requirement that violators communicate
directly with RICO victims. It reaches those who "conduct or partici-
pate . . in the conduct of [an] enterprise's affairs," 1 thereby creat-
ing a basis for a direct civil claim.
The policy choices made in Schatz and like cases bring to mind
the observation found in a leading California lawyer malpractice case,
Neel v. Magana, Olney, Levy, Cathcart & Gelfand."42 In that case the
California Supreme Court brought the law covering tolling of limita-
tions periods in suits against lawyers into line with standards covering
other service providers, saying:
[I]n our complex and interdependent society, human relations are
138. Schatz v. Rosenberg, 943 F.2d 485, 495 (4th Cir. 1991).
139. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(1) & (3) (1990).
140. For example, the Fourth Circuit in Schatz explained:
To state a claim for a primary violation of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, a
plaintiff must allege that the defendant (1) made an untrue statement of mate-
rial fact or omitted a material fact that rendered the statements misleading,
(2) in connection with the purchase or sale of a security, (3) with scienter, and
(4) which caused the plaintiff's losses.
Schatz, 943 F.2d at 489 (citing Schlifke v. Seafirst Corp., 866 F.2d 935, 943 (7th Cir.
1989)). This approach erroneously treats Rule 10b-5(2), which outlaws material misrep-
resentations and omissions, as if it is the entire rule.
141. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1988).
142. 6 Cal. 3d 176, 491 P.2d 421, 98 Cal. Rptr. 837 (1971).
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ever being further fit into a framework of legal rights and responsibili-
ties, and, in this process, the role of the lawyer has become increas-
ingly crucial. As more individuals come to depend upon him, his re-
sponsibility must broaden and deepen. . . . The legal calling can Ml
afford the preservation of a privileged protection against responsibil-
ity . ... 143
Evidently, a growing number of federal circuit courts believe that the
establishment of a privileged protection from responsibility is just
what the legal profession needs and deserves.14 4 At some point, 10b-5
scienter standards will again need to be revisited by the Supreme
Court.1"5 When that re-examination is made in the context of stan-
dards applicable to professionals, the Court must confront and resolve
the grave logical, practical, and policy questions mentioned above.
III. PLEADING SCIENTER IN CIVIL SUITS AGAINST PROFESSIONALS
A. Scope, Requirements, and Purpose of Rule 9(b)
The first defensive move apt to be considered on behalf of a pro-
fessional attacked in a civil suit alleging deception is the motion to
dismiss. If the suit asserts something resembling a fraud claim, the de-
fense will consider responding with a motion contending the plaintiff
has failed to plead fraud with the requisite particularity. The source of
this contention in federal courts is Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
(FRCP) 9(b). Rule 9(b) demands that "the circumstances constituting
fraud . . . shall be stated with particularity."14 6 It also provides that
"intent.. . and other conditions of mind of a person may be averred
generally.'"
Securities fraud and civil RICO claims premised on mail fraud,
wire fraud, or securities fraud148 are covered by Rule 9(b), as are allega-
tions of aiding and abetting fraud1 49 or conspiring to defraud.150 Where
143. Id. at 194, 491 P.2d at 432-33, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 848-49.
144. And perhaps the accounting profession as well.
145. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976) is the leading case.
Hochfelder was an appeal from a Seventh Circuit decision holding that auditors could
negligently aid and abet 10b-5 fraud.
146. FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b).
147. Id.
148. E.g., DiVittorio v. Equidyne Extractive Indus., 822 F.2d 1242, 1247 (2d Cir.
1987); Ross v. A.H. Robins Co., 607 F.2d 545, 557 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S.
946 (1980); Gutman v. Equidyne Extractive Indus., 769 F. Supp. 121 (S.D.N.Y. 1991);
Curtis v. Duffy, 742 F. Supp. 34 (D. Mass. 1990); Burt v. Danforth, 742 F. Supp. 1043
(E.D. Mo. 1990); Cruse v. Equitable Sec. of N.Y., Inc., 678 F. Supp. 1023 (S.D.N.Y.
1987).
149. E.g., Andreo v. Friedlander, Gaines, Cohen, Rosenthal & Rosenberg, 651 F.
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there are multiple defendants, the complaint must allege the specific
nature of each defendant's participation in the fraud.151 Not reached
by Rule 9(b) are claims alleging a nonfraudulent breach of fiduciary
duty,'52 conversion, unjust enrichment, "gross or culpable negli-
gence,"' 53 and undue influence. 54
Rule 9(b)'s text posits two sides to a fraud allegation: intent and
everything else. In the context of the hornbook elements of fraud, mis-
representation of a material fact, falsity of the representation, reliance,
damages, and scienter, 5 5 this means that the underlying facts support-
ing the first four need to be spelled out in detail.
It has been said that Rule 9(b) was created to further "three goals:
providing a defendant fair notice of the plaintiff's claim, to enable
preparation of a defense; protecting a defendant from harm to his rep-
utation or goodwill as a result of loose charges of fraud and deceit; and
reducing the number of strike suits.' 56
Complying with the spirit of the particularity requirement under
the rule should not be overly difficult, so long as Rule 9(b) is read in
conjunction with Rule 8. Rule 8(a) calls for pleadings to set forth "a
short and plain statement of the claim showing the pleader is entitled
to relief,'1 57 and Rule 8(e)(1) demands that "[e]ach averment. . . of a
Supp. 877, 880 (D. Conn. 1986); In re Cincinnati Gas & Elec. Sec. Litig., 594 F. Supp.
233, 237 (S.D. Ohio 1984).
150. E.g., Security Pac. Equip. Leasing, Inc. v. Earthworm Tractor Co., 1990 WL
96757 (S.D.N.Y. July 3, 1990) (WESTLAW); Burt, 742 F. Supp. at 1051 ("[P]laintiff's
allegations of mail and wire fraud, false proxy statements, violations of the Foreign Cor-
rupt Practices Act and defendants' conspiracy to conceal wrongdoing are wholly insuffi-
cient under Rule 9(b)."); Roberts v. Heim, 670 F. Supp. 1466, 1484 (N.D. Cal. 1987), afl'd
in part, rev'd in part sub nom. Roberts v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 857 F.2d 646
(9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 561 (1989). But see Hecht v. Commerce Clearing
House, Inc., 897 F.2d 21, 26 n.4 (2d Cir. 1990) ("On its face, Rule 9(b) applies only to
fraud or mistake"; thus plaintiff's "pleading of conspiracy apart from the underlying acts
of fraud is properly measured under the more liberal pleading requirements of Rule
8(a).").
151. DiVittorio, 822 F.2d at 1247; Block v. First Blood Assocs., 743 F. Supp. 194
(S.D.N.Y. 1990).
152. Robison v. Caster, 356 F.2d 924, 925 (7th Cir. 1966); Zucker v. Katz, 708 F.
Supp. 525 (S.D.N.Y. 1989). However, a suit alleging a fraudulent breach of fiduciary duty
is within Rule 9(b).
153. Burt v. Danforth, 742 F. Supp. 1043 (E.D. Mo. 1990).
154. Medeiros v. John Alden Life Ins. Co., 1990 WL 115606 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 10,
1990) (WESTLAW).
155. E.g., Mallis v. Bankers Trust Co., 615 F.2d 68, 80 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 1123 (1981); Smith v. Kurtzman, 176 Ill. App. 3d 840, 846, 531 N.E.2d 885, 889
(1988).
156. In re Union Carbide Corp. Consumer Prods. Business Sec. Litig., 666 F. Supp.
547, 558 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
157. FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a).
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pleading shall be simple, concise and direct." 115 What the drafters con-
templated as a sufficient fraud allegation within Rules 8 and 9 is evi-
denced by Form 13.159
That form shows how to allege a demand to set aside a debtor's
transfer of assets based on fraud: "Defendant C.D ... . conveyed all
his property . . . to defendant E.F. for the purpose of defrauding
plaintiff ... .e"6o F rm 13's allegation of fraud obviously is "short and
plain," as well as "simple, concise, and direct." It also presents a man-
ner of pleading that would be tossed out of court in a heartbeat by
many judges called on to assess similarly succinct allegations of fraud
made against professionals accused of furthering a business fraud.
B. Heightened Requirements for Pleading Scienter Under
Rule 9(b)
It is becoming increasingly difficult to allege satisfactorily fraudu-
lent intent in federal suits involving accountant or lawyer misconduct.
The Second Circuit and its district courts impose strict pleading re-
quirements on state of mind allegations in business fraud actions."" In
158. Id. 8(e).
159. FED. R. Civ. P. Appendix of Forms, Form 13. Under Rule 84, the allegations set
forth in the forms expressly are deemed "sufficient under the rules and are intended to
indicate the simplicity and brevity of statement which the rules contemplate." FED. R.
Civ. P. 84.
160. FED. R. Crv. P. Appendix of Forms, Form 13.
161. See e.g., Wexner v. First Manhattan Co., 902 F.2d 169, 172 (2d Cir. 1990)
("great specificity" not required, but the facts alleged must provide a "strong inference"
of fraudulent intent); Cosmas v. Hassett, 886 F.2d 8, 13 (2d Cir. 1989) ("To satisfy the
scienter requirement, a plaintiff need not allege facts which show the defendants had a
motive for committing fraud, so long as the plaintiff ... adequately identifies circum-
stances indicating conscious behavior by the defendants."); Beck v. Mfrs. Hanover Trust
Co., 320 F.2d 46, 50 (2d Cir. 1987) (requiring a factual basis for conclusory allegations of
scienter), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1005 (1988); Connecticut Nat'l Bank v. Fluor Corp., 808
F.2d 957, 962 (2d Cir. 1987) (observing that while scienter allegations do not need to be
made with "great specificity," plaintiffs must "provide at least a minimal factual basis
for their conclusory allegations of scienter"); Luce v. Edelstein, 802 F.2d 49, 57 (2d Cir.
1986) (demanding allegation of particular facts demonstrating defendants' knowledge
they were making misrepresentations at the time the statements were made); Bamco 18
v. Reeves, 675 F. Supp. 826 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (factual basis for state of mind allegations
necessary); Dannenberg v. Dorison, 603 F. Supp. 1238, 1241 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (alleging
that defendant participated in numerous transactions branded as fraudulent, without
pleading facts that would permit an inference of knowledge that any of these transac-
tions was fraudulent, is insufficient to state a claim for fraud).
Demonstrating the gulf in the Second Circuit between pleading misrepresentations
and acienter is Wexner.
There is no question that Wexner has adequately identified the statements al-
leged to be misrepresentations and properly indicated when, where and by
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Ross v. Bolton 16 2 the court showed a willingness to back-door a specific
pleading requirement for state of mind by reference to other matters:
"The time, place, and nature of the misrepresentations must be set
forth so that the defendant's intent to defraud, to employ any scheme
or artifice to defraud, to make any untrue statement of a material fact,
or to engage in any act or course of business that would operate as a
fraud under the securities laws is revealed.
1 6 3
Of course, this is sheer nonsense. First, because misrepresentations
may have been made does not necessarily reveal anything about the
speaker's state of mind. The mere fact that a specific statement, re-
port, or opinion was wrong and relied upon does not mean it was not
the product of an innocent or, at worst, negligent blunder. Second,
whether the defendant had fraudulent intent is something already
known to the defendant, who will deny its existence in any event. The
defendant does not need his supposed intent revealed in order to frame
a responsive pleading. Third, the complaint is not evidence and does
not go to the jury. Disclosing proof of the defendant's intent in the
complaint does not help the trier of fact do anything.
A recent pro-defense pleading case involving professionals is
O'Brien v. National Property Analysts Partners,1 64 a tax shelter fraud
class action. The Price Waterhouse accounting firm was one of "more
than sixty named and unnamed defendants116 5 sued under the federal
securities laws and civil RICO. All defendants settled, except for the
whom they were made. See Cosmas v. Hassett, 886 F.2d 8, 11 (2d Cir. 1989).
The amended complaint nonetheless fails to allege circumstances that give rise
to a strong inference that the defendants knew the statements to be false. See
Ouaknine, 897 F.2d at 79-80.
902 F.2d at 173.
162. 904 F.2d 819 (2d Cir. 1990).
163. Id. at 823. According to a Second Circuit District Court judge:
Rule 9(b) will be satisfied if the complaint specifies the following:
(1) precisely what statements were made in what documents or oral represen-
tations or what omissions were made, and (2) the time and place of each such
statement and the person responsible for making (or, in the case of omissions,
not making) the same, (3) the content of such statements and the manner in
which they misled the plaintiff, and (4) what the defendants "obtained as a
consequence of the fraud."
Conan Properties, Inc. v. Mattel, Inc., 619 F. Supp. 1167, 1172 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
The Seventh Circuit is in accord. As that court recently observed: "Although states
of mind [intent] may be pleaded generally, the 'circumstances' must be pleaded in detail.
This means the who, what, when, where and how- the first paragraph of any newspaper
story." DiLeo v. Ernst & Young, 901 F.2d 624, 627 17th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 347
(1990).
164. 719 F. Supp. 222 (S.D.N.Y. 1989), dismissal affd by 936 F.2d 674 (2d Cir.
1991).
165. Id. at 224.
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accounting firm and one other defendant. En route to dismissing all
claims against the accounting firm, the court noted that "[p]laintiffs
proffer only conclusory allegations as to Price Waterhouse's state of
mind."1 6 The court also observed that "[w]hile scienter need not be
alleged with great specificity," plaintiffs must "specifically plead those
events which give rise to a strong inference that defendants had an
intent to defraud, knowledge of falsity, or a reckless disregard for the
truth."167 According to the court, when an accountant's work product is
attacked as fraudulent, the plaintiff is required to "'allege particular
facts demonstrating the knowledge of defendants at the time that such
statements were false.' "16 The court also held that the knowledge ele-
ment of a fraud claim based on aider and abettor status needs to be
alleged with particularity.169
None of the O'Brien court's rulings on pleading state of mind can
be squared with Rule 9(b)'s language. If, as Rule 9(b) promises, "intent
.. . and other condition of mind . . . may be averred generally,
'170
then why were the plaintiffs' state of mind allegations in O'Brien dis-
missed as conclusory? Where in the rule is the mandate to plead scien-
ter with any specificity? Where does the rule require facts to be
pleaded demonstrating that defendants knew they were making false
representations? At least the court in O'Brien frankly stated the rea-
son for adopting special pleading requirements not justified by Rule
9(b)'s text: "Rule 9(b) is especially designed to protect the reputation
of. . . professionals from injury caused by unsubstantiated charges of
fraud."
71
Similarly, in Breard v. Sachnoff & Weaver, Ltd.17 2 the district
court noted that the particularity requirements of Rule 9(b) "are espe-
cially applicable to a complaint charging a lawyer with fraud in connec-
tion with an offering memorandum.' 17 3 The court also held that Rule
9(b) "mandates that a plaintiff meet a higher standard of pleading
fraud as it relates to attorneys."' 7 4 This reading of Rule 9(b) showed
166. Id. at 228.
167. Id.
168. Id. (quoting DiVittorio v. Equidyne Extractive Indus., Inc., 822 F.2d 1242, 1248
(2d Cir. 1987)).
169. Id. n.9.
170. FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b).
171. O'Brien v. National Property Analysts Partners, 719 F. Supp. 222, 227
(S.D.N.Y. 1939) dismissal aff'd by 936 F.2d 674 (2d Cir. 1991). See also Griffin v.
McNiff, 744 F. Supp. 1237, 1246 (S.D..N.Y. 1990) ("[A] charge of fraud against a law firm
should not lightly be inferred.").
172. RICO Bus. Disp. Guide (CCH) 11,191 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd, 941 F.2d 142 (2d Cir.
1991).
173. Id. 11,193.174. Id.
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nothing but unvarnished pro-lawyer bias, and proved to be too much
for even the Second Circuit, which reversed. The appellate court ad-
hered to its view that a factual basis for scienter needed to be alleged,
but found that it had been.
The facts held to show scienter were based on the defendant law
firm's having (1) drafted an initial limited offering memorandum that
failed to disclose that the venture's chief financier and guarantor, John
Berg, had been convicted for mail fraud and conspiracy in connection
with a previous limited partnership offering which featured a similar
financing arrangement, and (2) drafted a revised offering memorandum
that mentioned the conviction, but failed to disclose the nature of the
fraud, the fact that the past and present financings were very similar,
and opined that Berg's past criminal activity would not be material to
an investment in the new venture.17 5 The defendant law firm was
faulted on two counts. The Second Circuit viewed the failure to men-
tion the conviction in the first offering memorandum as reckless as a
matter of law. The court also faulted the lawyers for expressing an ad-
verse opinion on materiality without having attempted to investigate
the underlying facts. On this score it quoted with approval the princi-
ple that "'[a]n egregious refusal to see the obvious, or to investigate
the doubtful, may in some cases give rise to an inference of reckless-
ness.' " ' The court thus was willing to equate "willful blindness" or
"conscious avoidance" with recklessness. As will be seen in the follow-
ing section, conscious avoidance can provide not only evidence of reck-
lessness, but of knowledge itself.
The district court's willingness to dismiss the complaint as a mat-
ter of law in Breard, in the face of a record raising an inference of very
serious misconduct, shows how far some courts are willing to go to pro-
tect wayward professionals. Although it reversed, the Second Circuit
specifically adhered to prior precedent demanding that plaintiffs in
federal fraud cases "allege sufficient facts giving rise to a strong infer-
ence of fraudulent intent.
17 7
The Seventh Circuit appears to be joining the Second Circuit in
adding a stringent pleading requirement for state of mind. In DiLeo v.
Ernst & Young,17 8 the court observed:
Although Rule 9(b) does not require "particularity" with respect to
the defendants' mental state, the complaint still must afford a basis
for believing that plaintiffs could prove scienter. Barker observed, 797
175. Breard v. Sachnoff & Weaver, Ltd., 941 F.2d 142, 144 (2d Cir. 1991).
176. Id. (citing Goldman v. McMalhan, Brafman, Morgan & Co., 706 F. Supp. 256,
259 (S.D.N.Y. 1989)).
177. Id. at 145.
178. 901 F.2d 624 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 347 (1990).
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F.2d at 497, that the case "against an aider, abettor, or conspirator
may not rest on a bare inference that the defendant 'must have had'
knowledge of the facts. The plaintiff must support the inference with
some reason to conclude that the defendant has thrown in his lot with
the primary violators.
'17 9
The Seventh Circuit also noted that professionals who receive a normal
fee for their services would be behaving irrationally to aid and abet a
fraud, thereby risking mammoth damages. °8 0 Furthermore, the court
made clear its pro-professional leaning by adding: "One who believes
that another has behaved irrationally has to make a strong case."""'
Another means used to throttle fraud suits is to limit the use of
allegations made on information and belief.'8 ' Such allegations are per-
mitted only when the facts alleged "are peculiarly within the opposing
party's knowledge,"18 3 and, even then, the complaint must set forth the
source of the information and the reasons for the belief,8 4 and the spe-
cific facts that are alleged must support a strong inference of fraud., 5
C. Justifications for Heightened Pleading Requirements
An evident preoccupation with deterring strike suits in securi-
ties" 6 and civil RICO 8 7 cases has led some courts to demand specific-
179. Id. at 629.
180. Id.
181. Id. The complaint was faulted for failing to name any auditor "or explain what
that person might have had to gain for covering up Continental's wrongs." Id.
182. E.g., Luce v. Edelstein, 802 F.2d 49, 54 n.1 (2d Cir. 1986).
183. Id. (quoting Schlick v. Penn-Dixie Cement Corp., 507 F.2d 374, 379 (2d Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 976 (1975)).
184. E.g., New England Data Serv., Inc. v. Becher, 829 F.2d 286, 288 (1st Cir. 1987).
185. Wexner v. First Manhattan Co., 902 F.2d 169, 172 (2d Cir. 1990).
186. A bias against securities claims was revealed recently by a Second Circuit Dis-
trict Court opinion: "[Ifn a securities context, Rule 9(b) acts as a disincentive to the
large number of plaintiffs with groundless claims who prosecute charges with the knowl-
edge that there still might be some settlement value at the end of the line. Such suits are
often given the demeaning sobriquet 'strike suits."' McCoy v. Goldberg, 748 F. Supp.
146, 155 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (emphasis added). The opinion reveals no empirical support for
its suggestion that the courts are besieged by litigants bent on bringing frivolous securi-
ties actions. Nor is there any sign of large numbers of publicly reported ethics discipli-
nary actions against lawyers for assisting such misconduct, whether instituted by federal
district court judges or otherwise. Nor is there any explanation why Rule 11 does not
adequately address the problem.
The willingness of Second Circuit courts to warp the requirements of Rule 9(b) has
not gone unnoticed. In Jackson v. First Fed. Say., 709 F. Supp. 863 (E.D. Ark. 1988), the
Arkansas District Court expressly declined to follow a line of Rule 9(b) cases from the
Southern District of New York, suggesting the results were skewed because the Second
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ity in allegations of intent. Summarizing these developments, an emi-
nent authority states that a number of courts recently have "shown a
tendency to be more demanding in their application of Rule 9(b),"188
particularly in securities fraud and civil RICO cases, concluding that
"[t]hese cases undoubtedly reflect a reaction to the increased numbers
of these cases and the desire to filter out frivolous cases."'' 89 Accepting
this as true raises the question whether an increase in suits filed fur-
nishes any justification for changing pleading requirements purely by
means of judicial construction. Cogent attacks on courts' overly de-
manding applications of Rule 9(b) can be and have been made, partic-
ularly in the context of complex business fraud. 90 Nowhere in the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure does any authorization for a sliding scale
of judicial scrutiny of claims exist based on the frequency with which
claims are asserted or the perceived piety of the targeted defendants.
In truth, Rule 9(b)'s own text, allowing general averments of intent,
"recognizes that any attempt to require specificity in pleading a condi-
tion of mind would be unworkable and undesirable."' 9'
As for the second justification for new-found judicial tough-
ness-concern about frivolous suits-it is fair to ask why the gate-
keeper function is performed better under Rule 9(b) than Rule 11,
given that Rule 11 allows courts to impose sanctions on lawyers who
assert frivolous claims. 92 Would not a fine send a more potent message
187. Alarm over RICO actions has no doubt spooked some courts, driving them to
toughen pleading standards. In Plount v. American Home Assurance Co., 668 F. Supp.
204 (S.D.N.Y. 1987), the court eyed the "flood of cases under the RICO label" and con-
cluded that "all of the concerns that dictate that fraud be pleaded with particularity
exist with even greater urgency in civil RICO actions .... ." Id. at 206 (emphasis
added).
188. C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDUR CIVIL § 1297, AT
613-14 (2d ed. 1990) [HEREINAFTER WRIGHT & MILLER].
189. Id. at 614.
190. See Richman, Lively & Mell, The Pleading of Fraud: Rhymes Without Reason,
60 S. CAL. L. REv. 959 (1987).
191. Wright & Miller, supra note 188, § 1301, at 674. As the authors explain:
It would be unworkable because of the difficulty inherent in describing a state
of mind with exactitude and because of the complexity and prolixity that any
attempt to support these averments by setting forth all the evidence on which
they are based would introduce into pleadings ....
It might be argued that the second sentence in Rule 9(b) is unnecessary,
since it merely restates the content of Rule 8(a)(2). However, its placement in
Rule 9(b) suggests that the draftsmen felt a need to qualify the first sentence
of the rule and thus insure that the latter was not interpreted to require a
party pleading fraud or mistake to allege specifically the circumstances from
which fraudulent intention, knowledge of the falsity of a statement, or mis-
taken belief in its truth could be inferred.
Id. at 674-76.
192. Moreover, as one district court has noted, "[t]he high cost of maintaining con-
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to the offending lawyer than a dismissal order, particularly since dis-
missals under Rule 9(b) "are almost always" given with leave to
amend?198 The threat of sanctions under Rule 11 likewise serves to
safeguard defendants' reputations from unfair attack. Alternatively,
would not a judge's filing of a grievance with state ethical authorities
obtain the offending lawyer's attention? 194 The ready application of
both monetary and ethical sanctions casts doubt on the need for courts
to alter pleading requirements to protect defendants in certain cases.
D. Conclusion
The Rule 9(b) cases show that a lawyer who drafts a fraud com-
plaint against a professional relating to an alleged fraudulent scheme
should presume the facts alleged will need to provide an inference of
scienter for each defendant. Facts should be presented showing either
motive or circumstances indicating conscious behavior, including will-
ful blindness, linking each defendant to the alleged fraud. 95 Diligent
factual investigation must be undertaken to ascertain what the profes-
sionals knew, what was knowable, and what may have been deliber-
ately disregarded. Experts familiar with transactions of the nature in-
volved should be consulted for their views on what the professionals
did, must have done, should have done, or could have done.198
However, complying with these suggestions for achieving factual
specificity may become increasingly difficult. It is reasonable to ques-
tion whether some judges' displeasure over the quantity and quality of
business fraud filings is not self-validating. Judicial antipathy toward
meritless cases breeds higher standards, will generate more dismissals,
tingent fee litigation has largely eliminated" the strike suit "peril" addressed by Rule
9(b). In re Union Carbide Consumer Prods. Business Sec. Litig., 666 F. Supp. 547, 558
(S.D.N.Y. 1987).
193. Luce v. Edelstein, 802 F.2d 49, 56 (2d Cir. 1986); Yoder v. Orthomolecular Nu-
trition Inst., Inc., 751 F.2d 555, 562 n.6 (2d Cir. 1985).
194. Judges, as lawyers, have an ethical obligation to report lawyers who file frivo-
lous claims to disciplinary authorities. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrrY EC
7-4 (1980), provides in part: "[A] lawyer is not justified in asserting a position in litiga-
tion that is frivolous." See also id. DR 7-102(A)(1), (2), (5). The ABA's Model Rules of
Professional Conduct demand that: "A lawyer shall not bring ... a proceeding, or assert
... an issue therein, unless there is a basis for doing so that is not frivolous." MODEL
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDucT Rule 3.1 (1983). The mandatory obligation for judges
who are lawyers to turn in offending lawyers stems from the Code's DR 1-103(A) and
Model Rule 8.3(a). For a rare example of a court reporting a lawyer before it to an ethics
tribunal, see Greycas v. Proud, 826 F.2d 1560, 1568 (7th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S.
1043 (1988).
195. E.g., Cosmas v. Hassett, 886 F.2d 8, 13 (2d Cir. 1989).
196. For factors to be evaluated in assembling factual allegations regarding the sci-
enter issue, see infra notes 295-343 and accompanying text.
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and will result, one may expect, in more antipathy. In the face of this,
promoters of fraudulent ventures would be remiss if they did not bury
forum selection clauses in their subscription agreements, trapping
luckless investors around the country into suing in hostile forums.
Adding to the pressure facing a lawyer called on to draft a 10b-5
complaint attacking professionals believed to have furthered a massive
fraud is the Supreme Court's recent ruling in Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind,
Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson.19 7 In this case the Court held that a
10b-5 suit must be filed within one year of discovery of facts constitut-
ing the violation, with an absolute three-year statute of repose. Lampf
and the pleading cases discussed in this section create a tightening vise
on plaintiffs' counsel. A short statute of limitations coupled with stone-
walling tactics commonly used by fraudfeasors in response to their vic-
tims' requests for information make it difficult for prospective plain-
tiffs to gather facts; at the same time courts increasingly are throwing
cases out of court for lack of factual specificity in pleading. As the grip
tightens, there is room to wonder whether some judges' use of Rule
9(b) to throttle business fraud cases does not exhibit the sort of behav-
ior once characterized by Justice Blackmun as "a preternatural solici-
tousness for corporate well-being and a seeming callousness toward the
investing public."'198
IV. PROVING SCIENTER IN FRAUD CASES AGAINST PROFESSIONALS
A. Culpability Requirements Under Criminal Law
1. Intent Under the Model Penal Code
Given the existing confusion over culpability standards in civil
cases, criminal law precedent has potential to offer some guidance. One
would assume that determining culpability standards applicable to
professionals under statutory criminal laws ought to be easy. After all,
legislatures are delegated the responsibility of defining the elements of
criminal offenses, and federal crimes are "solely creatures of stat-
ute."'199 Nonetheless, the Supreme Court observed in United States v.
Bailey200 that "the word 'intent' is quite ambiguous,"'20 1 and that
"[flew areas of criminal law pose more difficulty than the proper defi-
197. 111 S. Ct. 2773 (1991).
198. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 762 (1975) (Blackmun,
J., dissenting).
199. Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 424 (1985). Of course, Congress is
obliged to work within constitutional limits. Id. n.6.
200. 444 U.S. 394 (1980).
201. Id. at 408.
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nition of the mens rea required for any particular crime. '20 2 This con-
fusion has been attributed to the simplistic tendency of the common
law to classify the intent requirement of crimes as either "general in-
tent" or "specific intent" with there being no uniform, consistent, or
coherent usage of the terms. 3 The criminal law's ambiguity on the
crucial issue of intent spawned an influential reform effort in the form
of the Model Penal Code prepared under the auspices of the American
Law Institute.
More than thirty-five years ago, the Model Penal Code's drafters
addressed the criminal law's confusing approach to culpability issues in
an effort
to advance the clarity of draftsmanship in the delineation of the defi-
nitions of specific crimes, to provide a distinct framework against
which these definitions may be tested, and to dispel the obscurity
with which the culpability requirement is often treated when such
concepts as "general criminal intent," "mens rea," "presumed intent,"
"malice," "wilfulness," "scienter," and the like must be employed.
What Justice Jackson called "the variety, disparity and confusion" of
judicial definitions of "the requisite but elusive mental element in
crime should as far as possible, be rationalized by a criminal code. ' '2
Accordingly, Model Penal Code section 2.02 "attempts the extremely
difficult task of articulating the kinds of culpability that may be re-
quired for the establishment of liability."20 5 Section 2.02(1) provides
that "a person is not guilty of an offense unless he acted purposely,
knowingly, recklessly or negligently, as the law may require, with re-
spect to each material element of the offense."20 The Model Code's
analytical demand that a level of culpability be assigned to each ele-
ment of the offense found favor with the Supreme Court in Bailey,
which characterized an element-by-element analysis as "a useful tool
for making sense of an otherwise opaque concept.
20 7
202. Id. at 403.
203. See id. at 403 (citing W. LAFAvE & A. ScoTT, HANDBOOK ON CRImINAL LAW § 28,
at 201-02 (1972)).
204. MODEL PENAL CODE & CoMMENrARIES § 2.02 comment 1, at 230 (1985).
205. Id. at 229.
206. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(1) (1985). The hierarchy does not cover criminal
offenses with no mens rea requirement. Those offenses are categorized as "violations."
Id. § 2.05(1).
207. Bailey, 444 U.S. at 407. The element-by-element approach was deemed subject
to two qualifications. First, congressional intent concerning any level of culpability for an
offense is to be followed. Id. Second, the Court vaguely warned courts or scholars work-
ing within the systematic approach not to "become obsessed with hair-splitting distinc-
tions, either traditional or novel, that Congress neither stated nor implied when it made
the conduct criminal." Id. at 405-03.
[Vol. 42
46
South Carolina aw Review, Vol. 42, Iss. 4 [2020], Art. 3
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol42/iss4/3
SCIENTER REQUIREMENTS
Synonyms for "purposely," sitting at the top level of culpability in
the Model Penal Code's descending hierarchy, are "intentionally,"
"with intent," "designed," or "with design. '20 8 "Willfully," which has
been termed "a word of many meanings,' 20 9 is equated with "know-
ingly," not "purposely."21 0 "Purposely" generally correlates with the
common law's "specific intent. 2 1 ' Both "knowingly" and "recklessly"
correspond, according to the Model Code's drafters, with the "the com-
mon law requirement of 'general intent.' ,212 The general intent re-
quirement at common law was not a rigorous one. Indeed, as Justice
Brennan pointed out in Smith v. Wade,21 3 at common law "crimes of
intent commonly required only intent to do the criminal act (and, in
some cases, knowledge that the injury would likely follow), rather than
actual ill will or purpose to inflict an injury." 214 The limited distinction
between purpose and knowledge has not been viewed as significant,
since "there is good reason for imposing liability whether the defend-
ant desired or merely knew of the practical certainty of the result."2 1 5
Hence, whether a criminal defendant has acted "purposely" or "know-
ingly" usually makes little difference.
Under the Model Penal Code, the proper categorization of conduct
within the four-part hierarchy depends on whether the element in-
volves: (1) the nature of the person's conduct, (2) results of the per-
208. MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.13(11)-(12) (1985).
209. Spies v. United States, 317 U.S. 492, 497 (1943). Judge Learned Hand partici-
pated in drafting the Model Penal Code. In the course of ALI proceedings in the Code's
development, this exchange occurred between the Reporter and Judge Hand:
JUDGE HAND: Do you use [willfully] throughout? How often do you use
it? It's a very dreadful word.
MR. WECHSLER: We will never use it in the Code ....
JUDGE HAND: .... It's an awful word! It is one of the most trouble-
some words in a statute that I know. If I were to have the index purged, 'wilful'
[sic] would lead all the rest in spite of its being at the end of the alphabet.
MR. WECHSLER: I agree with you Judge Hand, and I promise you un-
equivocally that the word will never be used in the definition of any offense in
the Code.
MODEL PENAL CODE & COMMErAIES § 2.02, comment 10, at 249 n.47 (1985).
210. Id. § 2.02(8). However, in United States v. Murdock, 290 U.S. 392, 394 (1933),
the Court equated "willfully" as used in criminal statutes with "an act done with a bad
purpose," though it also recognized that the term is used often to denote "an act which is
intentional, or knowing, or voluntary."
211. MODEL PENAL CODE & COMMENTARIES § 2.02 comment, at 233-34 (1985) (citing
ALI Proceedings 160 (1955)).
212. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(3) explanatory note, at 23 (1985).
213. 461 U.S. 30 (1983).
214. Id. at 41.
215. United States v. United Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 445 (1978). The Court
noted that: "In either circumstance the defendants are consciously behaving in a way the
law prohibits, and such conduct is a fitting object of criminal punishment." Id.
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son's conduct, or (3) the person's appreciation of the attendant circum-
stances.216 The definitional differences between the Model Penal
Code's first two categories2 17 are slight,218 as shown in the following
chart:
Type of Material "Purposely" "Knowingly"
Element of Crime
Nature of Conscious object to Aware conduct
Conduct engage in such is of that
conduct nature
Results of Conscious object to Practically
person's conduct cause such result certain conduct
will cause such
a result
Appreciation of Aware or believe or Aware circumstances
attendant hope circumstances exist
circumstances exist
216. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 (1985).
217. Section 2.02(2)(a) defines "purposely" in the following way:
A person acts purposely with respect to a material element of an offense
when:
(i) if the element involves the nature of his conduct or a result
thereof, it is his conscious object to engage in conduct of that nature or
to cause such a result; and
(ii) if the element involves the attendant circumstances, he is aware
of the existence of such circumstances or he believes or hopes that they
exist.
Id. § 2.02(a)
"Knowingly" is defined in § 2.02(b):
A person acts knowingly with respect to a material element of an offense
when:
(i) if the element involves the nature of his conduct or the attend-
ant circumstances, he is aware that his conduct is of that nature or that
such circumstances exist; and
(ii) if the element involves a result of his conduct, he is aware that
it is practically certain that his conduct will cause such a result.
Id. § 2.02(b).
218. Comment 2 to § 2.02 recognizes that generally an inconsequential difference
exists between an actor having a "conscious object to perform an action" and "acting
knowingly." The need for differentiation is ascribed to statutes giving rise to "the awk-
ward concept of 'specific intent.' MODEL PENAL CODE & COMMENTARIEs § 2.02 comment
2, at 233-34 (1985). Examples of specific intent crimes given by the drafters are treason,
"in so far as a purpose to aid the enemy is an ingredient of the offense," and "attempts
and conspiracy, where a true purpose to effect the criminal result is requisite for liabil-
ity." Id. at 234. See also United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 404 (1980) (noting that
heightened culpability is relevant in "certain narrow classes of crimes," such as attempt,
conspiracy, treason, and homicide).
[Vol. 42
48
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 42, Iss. 4 [2020], Art. 3
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol42/iss4/3
SCIENTER REQUIREMENTS
In view of the major role recklessness plays in civil scienter formu-
lations, it is interesting to note that, as recently as 1955, "recklessness"
evidently was not defined by any statute.21 The Model Penal Code's
drafters defined "reckless misconduct" as follows:
A person acts recklessly with respect to a material element of an
offense when he consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable
risk that the material element exists or will result from his conduct.
The risk must be of such a nature and degree that, considering the
nature and purpose of the actor's conduct and the circumstances
known to him, its disregard involves a gross deviation from the stan-
dard of conduct that a law-abiding person would observe in the actor's
situation.
2 20
The Model Code's criminal recklessness definition, which comfortably
embraces the generally accepted 10b-5 recklessness definition quoted
above, 22 1 substantially has been accepted as a model for the formula-
tion of recklessness in many states' penal codes.
222
"Purposely" and "knowingly" both connote premeditation and de-
liberate misconduct, with the chief difference being that the person
acting purposely is seeking a certain result consciously, while the per-
son acting knowingly is aware the result is "practically [but not en-
tirely] certain. '223 The "recklessly" definition expands on the concept
of the actor as risk-of-injury creator. It addresses misconduct arising
from conscious risk creation in the face of long odds for success and an
unacceptable risk of serious injury in the event of failure. The miscon-
duct envisioned by "recklessly" revolves around appreciation of a grave
contingent risk of harm to others that the gambler consciously created
and disregarded.
2 24
Accountability based on probability analysis likewise is embraced
by the Model Penal Code's knowledge definition, which reads: "When
knowledge of the existence of a particular fact is an element of an of-
fense, such knowledge is established if a person is aware of a high
probability of its existence, unless he actually believes that it does not
219. MODEL PENAL CODE & COMMErAREs § 2.02 comment 3, at 238 (1985).
220. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(c) (1985).
221. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
222. MODEL PENAL CODE & COMMENTARIES § 2.02 comment 3, at 238 (1985).
223. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(b)(ii) (1985).
224. MODEL PENAL CODE & COMENTARIES § 2.02 comment 3, at 236-37 (1985).
Under the Model Penal Code, "negligently" generally follows the definition of "reck-
lessly," with the chief difference being that a person is not required to "consciously dis-
regard" the risk. It is enough that the person "should be aware of the substantial and
unjustifiable risk," and that failure to perceive the risk involves a gross deviation from
the standard of care that a reasonable person would observe. Id. § 2.02(d).
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exist.
225
The Model Code's explanation of "knowledge" is reminiscent of
the Derry v. Peek220 court's holding that a person with an honest but
unreasonable belief in the truth of his statement cannot be liable for
fraud. This formulation of knowledge in the criminal context was ap-
proved by the United States Supreme Court in Leary v. United
States,227 and each of the federal circuit courts has either adopted the
definition or borrowed heavily from it.228 It has been attacked for im-
porting a recklessness standard into the concept of knowledge.2 9 The
nub of the criticism is that recklessness and the Model Code's knowl-
edge definition both are built on apprehension of probability, while
true knowledge requires certainty.230 The supposed requirement that
knowledge rest on nothing short of absolute certainty has not stopped
the Supreme Court from finding criminal intent based on a knowledge
standard when action was undertaken in the face of a probable, but
not certain, illegal result.231 In any event, the Model Code's knowledge
definition has the virtue of protecting a defendant shown to have acted
in subjective good faith.
225. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(7) (1985).
226. 14 App. Cas. 337 (H.L. 1889). See supra notes 14-22 and accompanying text.
227. 395 U.S. 6, 46 n.93 (1968). The approval was reiterated in Turner v. United
States, 396 U.S. 398, 416 n.29 (1970), and United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601, 614 n.5
(1971) (Brennan, J., concurring).
228. Robbins, The Ostrich Instruction: Deliberate Ignorance as Criminal Mens
Rea, 81 J. CRuK L. & CRIMINOLOGY 191, 194 n.11 (1990).
229. Id. at 191-205, 223-24, 231-32.
230. Id. at 222.
231. In United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422 (1978), Mr. Justice
Burger, writing for the majority, acknowledged the Model Penal Code's four levels of
intent, and eliminated the lower two as possibilities in criminal antitrust cases, saying.
"In dealing with the kinds of business decisions upon which the antitrust laws focus, the
concepts of recklessness and negligence have no place." Id. at 444. The Court then set-
tled on an intent requirement satisfied by proof of "action undertaken with knowledge of
its probable consequences and having the requisite anticompetitive effects." Id. The
Court in United States Gypsum did not read a recklessness standard out of the criminal
antitrust laws; instead, it actually applied the Model Penal Code's recklessness formula-
tion. Under the Model Code's recklessness definition, culpability follows when the actor
"consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material element
[anticompetitive effects] exists or will result from his conduct." MODEL PENAL CODE §
2.02(2)(c) (1985). A risk "consciously disregarded" must be apprehended and known in
the first place. Significantly, in United States Gypsum, the Court focused on the actor's
apprehension of the probable results (anticompetitive effects) of the actor's conduct, not
on the probable existence of a fact. The Model Code's drafters made clear that one who
disregards the high probability that a fact exists is charged with knowledge. Recklessness
results "when what is involved is the result of the defendant's conduct, necessarily a
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Under the Model Penal Code's hierarchy of culpability, proof that
the defendant acted purposely meets a knowingly requirement, and
proof that a person acted purposely and knowingly meets a reckless-
ness culpability threshold.232 It is important to note, however, that
under Model Penal Code section 2.02(3), any criminal law element that
does not have a culpability-level prescribed for it can be satisfied if the
person acted purposely, knowingly, or recklessly.23 3 In other words, the
drafters envisioned recklessness sufficing to establish criminal culpabil-
ity absent evidence of a contrary legislative intent. They did this ac-
cepting "as the basic norm what usually is regarded as the common law
position. '234 The generally accepted common-law position views reck-
lessness as a sufficient level of criminal intent; this casts doubt on the
reasonableness of courts in 10b-5 cases demanding a higher level of
scienter in civil suits against professionals.
2. "Conscious Avoidance" As Evidence of Intent
In criminal cases, a crucial task for prosecutors, defense counsel,
and judges is determining the level of intent necessary to convict and
then formulating instructions to guide the jury's deliberations. Here,
descriptions of the borderlines between culpability formulations be-
come key, with the debate assuming partisan aspects: the defense
wants the prosecution to meet the highest possible standard of proof;
the prosecution will seek an intent standard that is as easily satisfied
as possible. Thus, advocates with a pro-defense bias will demand pros-
ecutors meet a "purpose" or "knowledge" standard defined to have the
highest possible culpability threshold. They may argue that the prose-
cution must fail absent proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the de-
fendant had knowledge of a material element of the crime as a matter
of cold-blooded, deliberate, absolute, subjective certainty. For example,
those with a pro-defense outlook may contend that:
[c]riminal knowledge requires certainty and a corresponding absence
of doubt. It is this distinction between certainty and probability that
separates knowledge from the legal concept of recklessness: both in-
volve awareness, but recklessness describes recognition of probability
while knowledge requires certainty. Therefore, one "knows" some-
thing only if he or she is certain of it.
2 5
232. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(5) (1985).
233. When the culpability sufficient to establish a material element of an offense is
not proscribed by law, this element is established if a person acts purposely, knowingly,
or recklessly with respect thereto. Id. § 2.02(3).
234. Id. § 2.02(c) comment 5, at 244.
235. Robbins, supra note 228, at 222.
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Prosecutors, on the other hand, know that criminal defendants
who go to trial, at least those who are represented by able counsel,
tend to be very uncooperative. The one thing criminal defendants are
apt to admit is that they know for certain that they do not deserve to
go to jail. To counteract a claimed lack of knowledge by criminal de-
fendants, prosecutors are forced to rely on circumstantial evidence to
show either that the defendant actually was aware of the element in
question, or that the defendant must have been aware of the element
because he consciously disregarded the substantial and unjustifiable
risk the element either was present or would result from his conduct.
236
This second form of behavior allows an inference of knowledge based
on the jury's conclusion that the defendant must have been aware of
his own conscious disregard of material risk. Whether deemed "con-
scious avoidance, ' 237 "deliberate disregard, '23 8 "willful blindness,"23
"deliberately closing [one's] eyes,"240 or having the "conscious purpose
to avoid learning the truth, '241 the basic concept is the same and is
simply stated: A defendant who denies knowing may be proved to have
had the requisite guilty knowledge based on accumulated circumstan-
tial evidence. According to the Eighth Circuit, "[t]he willful blindness
236. See United States v. Markopoulos, 848 F.2d 1036, 1040 (10th Cir. 1988); United
States v. Alvarado, 838 F.2d 311, 314 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1222 (1988). Thus,
in United States v. Manriquez Arbizo, 833 F.2d 244 (10th Cir. 1987), the trial court used
a "deliberate ignorance" instruction to describe to the jury how deliberate ignorance may
be circumstantial proof of scienter, and the appellate court affirmed, observing:
The purpose of such an instruction is to alert the jury to the fact that the act
of avoidance of knowledge of particular facts may itself circumstantially show
that the avoidance was motivated by sufficient guilty knowledge to satisfy the
statute. The quoted instruction makes that clear. It informs the jury that it
may look at the charade of ignorance as circumstantial proof of knowledge. It
does not authorize conviction of one who in fact does not have guilty knowl-
edge. One can in fact not know many detailed facts but still have enough
knowledge to demonstrate consciousness of guilty conduct sufficient to satisfy
the "knowing" element of the crime. In effect, the instruction is nothing more
than a refined circumstantial evidence instruction properly tailored to the facts
of a case like this.
Id. at 248.
237. E.g., United States v. Hanlon, 548 F.2d 1096, 1101 (2d Cir. 1977).
238. E.g., United States v. Gentile, 530 F.2d 461, 470 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 426
U.S. 936 (1976).
239. E.g., Edwards, The Criminal Degrees of Knowledge, 17 MODERN L. REv. 294,
301 (1954).
240. United States v. Sarantos, 455 F.2d 877, 881 (2d Cir. 1972). See also United
States v. Fingado, 934 F.2d 1163, 1166 (10th Cir. 1991) ("The element of knowledge may
be satisfied by inferences drawn from proof that a defendant deliberately closed his eyes
to what would otherwise have been obvious to him.").
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instruction . .. plays a role when knowledge is required, but as a
mechanism for inference, not as a substitute for knowledge. ' 242 Con-
scious avoidance or willful blindness is not knowledge, it is evidence of
knowledge.
Knowledge may be inferred from circumstantial evidence,4 3 and it
often must be, particularly when the facts are tangled, the transaction
is complex, and the defendants are sophisticated, or at least clever. As
the First Circuit noted in United States v. Wells:2"4 "Being a state of
mind, willfulness can rarely be proved by direct evidence. Rather, find-
ings of willfulness usually require that fact finders reasonably draw in-
ferences from available facts."2 5 Conduct properly characterized as
242. Mattingly v. United States, 924 F.2d 785, 791 (8th Cir. 1991). On the other
hand, the Second Circuit in United States v. Berkery, 919 F.2d 817 (2d Cir. 1990), up-
held an instruction charging: "[T]he element of knowledge of a given fact may be satis-
fied by proof beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant acted with a conscious avoid-
ance of what the truth was, unless he actually believed the contrary to be true." Id. at
822. The Berkery charge corresponds to the explanation of knowledge found in MODEL
PENAL CODE § 2.02(7) (1985) and accepted by the Supreme Court in Leary and Turner.
See supra note 227 and accompanying text. In United States v. Hiland, 909 F.2d 1114
(8th Cir. 1990), the Eighth Circuit suggested that conscious avoidance can supply the
knowledge element in a prosecution: "In essence, a willful blindness instruction 'allows
the jury to impute knowledge to [the defendant] of what should be obvious to him, if it
found beyond a reasonable doubt, a conscious purpose to avoid enlightenment." Id. at
1130 (quoting United States v. Zimmerman, 832 F.2d 454, 458 (8th Cir. 1987)). The will-
ful blindness instruction upheld in Hiland, as presented in the appellate opinion, reads:
The element of knowledge may be satisfied by inferences drawn from
proof that a defendant deliberately closed his eyes, which [sic] would have oth-
erwise been obvious to him. A finding beyond a reasonable doubt with [sic] a
conscious purpose to avoid in light [sic] would permit an inference of
knowledge.
Stated another way, a defendant's knowledge of a fact may be inferred
from willful blindness to the existing fact. It's entirely up to you as to whether
you find any deliberate closing of the eyes and inferences to be drawn from any
such evidence.
The showing of negligence of a statement [sic] is not sufficient to support
a finding of willfulness or knowledge.
Id. at 1129-30 n.22.
243. United States v. Hooks, 780 F.2d 1526, 1529 (10th Cir.) (circumstantial evi-
dence, taken together with any reasonable inferences which flow from such evidence, is
sufficient to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1128
(1986); United States v. Cerro, 775 F.2d 908, 911 (7th Cir. 1985).
244. 766 F.2d 12 (1st Cir. 1985).
245. Id. at 20. See also Aiken v. United States, 108 F.2d 182, 183 (4th Cir. 1939)
("Fraudulent intent, as a'mental element of crime... is too often difficult to prove by
direct and convincing evidence. In many cases it must be inferred from a series of seem-
ingly isolated acts and instances which have been rather aptly designated as badges of
fraud. When these are sufficiently numerous they may in their totality properly justify
an inference of a fraudulent intent; and this is true even though each act or instance,
standing by itself, may seen rather unimportant.") Griswold v. Gebbie, 126 Pa. 353, 365,
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reckless may not be exactly the same thing as knowing or intentional
misconduct, but evidence of recklessness entitles the finder of fact to
infer the requisite guilty knowledge or intent to defraud.
24
1
Thus, criminal prosecutors increasingly are urging use of deliber-
ate ignorance or "ostrich" instructions to convey to the jury that the
defendant's behavior in avoiding knowledge showed sufficient aware-
ness to satisfy the knowledge, intent, or scienter requirement of a spe-
cific criminal statute.24 7 By attacking defendants for consciously avoid-
17 A. 673, 675 (1889) ("Fraud and intent to deceive do not proclaim themselves openly,
nor can they usually be proved by direct evidence."); Milich, Securities Fraud Under
Section 10(b) and Rule 1~b-5: Scienter, Recklessness, and the Good Faith Defense, 11 J.
Cone. L. 179, 185 (1986).
246. See United States v. Castro, 887 F.2d 988, 994 (9th Cir. 1989) (in a case charg-
ing misapplication of bank funds under 18 U.S.C. § 656, "[i]ntent to defraud may be
inferred from a defendant's reckless disregard of the bank's interests"); United States v.
Adamson, 700 F.2d 953, 965 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 833 (1983) (reversing crimi-
nal convictions under 18 U.S.C. § 656 because of jury instructions that likened reckless-
ness to intent to defraud, but also observing "[T]he trier of fact may infer the required
intent, i.e., knowledge, from the defendant's reckless disregard of the interest of the
bank; however, jury instructions should not equate recklessness with intent to injure or
defraud.").
247. In United States v. Manriquez Arbizo, 833 F.2d 244 (10th Cir. 1987), the court
stated:
Arbizo alleges error in the court's instruction to the jury on guilty knowledge.
Count one of the indictment charged Arbizo with "knowingly and intention-
ally" possessing marijuana with intent to distribute. 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). The
district court gave the following instruction explaining how "deliberate igno-
rance" itself may be circumstantial proof of the existence of the necessary
knowledge of illegal conduct:
The element of knowledge may be satisfied by inferences drawn
from proof that a defendant deliberately closed his eyes to what would
otherwise have been obvious to him.
A finding beyond a reasonable doubt of a conscious purpose to
avoid enlightenment would permit an inference of knowledge.
Stated another way, a defendant's knowledge of a fact may be in-
ferred from willful blindness to the existence of the fact.
It is entirely up to you as to whether you find any deliberate closing
of the eyes and the inference to be drawn from such evidence.
A showing of negligence or mistake is not sufficient to support a
finding of willfulness or knowledge.
Arbizo argues the facts of his case were insufficient to warrant giving the
instruction. He alleges the instruction allowed the jury to convict him on a
negligence standard of knowledge-that he should have known his conduct was
illegal-rather than the higher standard of actual knowledge required by the
statute.
We have previously approved the giving of a similar instruction. The pur-
pose of such an instruction is to alert the jury to the fact that the act of avoid-
ance of knowledge of particular facts may itself circumstantially show that the
[Vol. 42
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ing incriminating information, prosecutors in drug cases have been able
to thwart drug pushers' efforts to escape accountability by keeping
participants in their criminal enterprises uninformed of certain facts.248
A conscious avoidance jury charge allows the jury to pierce through the
trappings of ignorance to the reality of complicity. The Tenth Circuit
discerned in one recent drug case:
"[DIeliberate ignorance" refers to circumstantial evidence that the
person against whom it is employed has actual knowledge of a fact in
issue.. . . "A deliberate ignorance instruction alerts the jury 'that the
act of avoidance of knowledge of particular facts may itself circum-
stantially show that the avoidance was motivated by sufficient guilty
knowledge to satisfy the . . . "knowing" element of the crime.' ,249
Facts that tend to prove actual knowledge and deliberate igno-
rance naturally will tend to overlap and intertwine, a reality deliber-
ately ignored by the Tenth Circuit in its recent ruling that the same
facts cannot be used to prove "both actual knowledge and deliberate
ignorance,"250 on the theory that "the two are mutually exclusive con-
cepts."'251 Of course, this is not true. Though knowledge and ignorance
are antonyms, the prosecutor does not use proof of deliberate igno-
rance in a criminal case to prove an absence of knowledge, but just the
opposite. Obviously, a jury has no business convicting a defendant
found to have lacked knowledge of an element of the offense. But ac-
tual knowledge and deliberate ignorance can coexist very comfortably.
After all, what the jury shows it has concluded when it convicts based
on a deliberate ignorance instruction is that the defendant actually did
have guilty knowledge.
252
avoidance was motivated by sufficient guilty knowledge to satisfy the statute.
The quoted instruction makes that clear. It informs the jury that it may look
at the charade of ignorance as circumstantial proof of knowledge. It does not
authorize conviction of one who in fact does not have guilty knowledge. One
can in fact not know many detailed facts but still have enough knowledge to
demonstrate consciousness of guilty conduct sufficient to satisfy the "knowing"
element of the crime. In effect, the instruction is nothing more than a refined
circumstantial evidence instruction properly tailored to the facts of a case like
this.
Id. at 248 (citations omitted).
248. E.g., id. at 249 ("Because the evidence was sufficient for a jury to find beyond a
reasonable doubt Arbizo either directly knew or circumstantially knew by deliberately
avoiding acquiring knowledge of the contents of the bags, the instruction was
appropriate.").
249. United States v. De Francisco-Lopez, 939 F.2d 1405, 1409 (10th Cir. 1991).
250. Id. at 1410.
251. Id.
252. As the Tenth Circuit stated in De Francisco-Lopez: "The evidence must estab-
lish that the defendant had subjective knowledge of his criminal behavior." 939 F.2d at
1991]
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When evidence of both direct knowledge and conscious avoidance
exists, it is reasonable for a court to instruct that the knowledge ele-
ment of an offense may be established by proof of either conscious
avoidance or positive knowledge. 25 3 A deliberate ignorance instruction
is proper if there is evidence of suspicious circumstances, but not if the
evidence only supports a conclusion of positive knowledge. 254 A defend-
ant who steadfastly protests good faith ignorance in the face of a
mountain of incriminating evidence that is unequivocal and readily
seen is fair game for both types of charges.255 To determine whether
the defendant acted honestly, the jury is entitled to look through a
defendant's protestations of lack of knowledge, negligence, or mis-
take.256 Conversely, it is improper to use a willful avoidance instruction
when no facts point to conduct that translates into conscious avoidance
of the truth.257 Otherwise, the charge could yield a conviction based on
mere negligence.
258
1409. This is just what a "willful ignorance" instruction is targeted at showing-not sub-
jective ignorance, in which case the defendant goes free, but subjective knowledge.
253. United States v. Jewell, 532 F.2d 697, 700 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 951
(1976). See also G. WLLIAMs, CRAHNAL LAW: THE GENERAL PART § 57, at 159 (2d ed.
1961) ("The rule that wilful [sic] blindness is equivalent to knowledge is essential, and is
found throughout the criminal law.").
254. See, e.g., United States v. Sanchez-Robles, 927 F.2d 1070, 1074 (9th Cir. 1991).
255. See United States v. Victor Teicher & Co., 1990 WL 37842 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 27,
1990) (WESTLAW), in which the court observed: "Typically the government requests
and obtains a conscious avoidance charge when a defendant's conduct, while arguably
furnishing direct evidence of his guilty knowledge, may in the alternative be regarded as
reflecting conscious avoidance of knowledge." Id. A conscious avoidance instruction may
be refused, however, when the government's theory from the outset is based on actual
knowledge, and it seeks to include an alternative conscious avoidance late in the game.
Id.
256. See United States v. Cheek, 111 S. Ct. 604, 611-12 (1991) (pointing out the
jury's right to find the government has proved knowledge by rejecting the defendant's
cover story). Thus, in United States v. Farfan-Carreon, 935 F.2d 678 (5th Cir. 1991), a
conscious avoidance charge was used to convict in the face of the defendant's story that
he had asked and had been assured the truck he drove did not carry contraband. In
United States v. Fingado, 934 F.2d 1163 (10th Cir. 1991), a tax prosecution, the defend-
ant was charged with willful failure to file. He contended he had a good faith belief in
the accuracy of his understanding of the tax laws, but he avoided verifying his views by
consulting with an accountant or an attorney, choosing instead to consult with other,
like-minded citizens who agreed there was no obligation to file returns. The jury was
instructed not to convict based on negligence, mistake, and not to convict if it deter-
mined Fingado acted in good faith or honestly misunderstood the tax law.
257. See, e.g., United States v. Manriquez Arbizo, 833 F.2d 244, 249 (10th Cir.
1987); United States v. Murrieta-Bejarano, 552 F.2d 1323, 1323 (9th Cir. 1977).
258. See, e.g., United States v. Bright, 517 F.2d 584, 587 (2d Cir. 1975) ("A negligent
or a foolish person is not a criminal when criminal intent is an ingredient.").
[Vol. 42
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3. Application of Conscious Avoidance Theory to Professionals
Involved in Business Transactions
Willful avoidance instructions have been used most conspicuously
in drug prosecutions, but drug racketeers are not the only criminals
who make attractive targets for willful avoidance instructions; so do
participants in fraudulent business ventures. A well-known criminal se-
curities case involving both a lawyer and an accountant is United
States v. Benjamin.259 The opinion, written by Judge Friendly, is
known for its dicta, premised in part on the Model Penal Code. It sug-
gests that lawyers and accountants can engage in criminal securities
violations by engaging in willful avoidance equivalent to
recklessness.8 0
More recently, in United States v. Glick,2"" a CPA who blatantly
violated accounting principles and auditing standards was convicted in
a case in which the jury was charged as follows on the definition of
"knowingly": "An act is done knowingly if done voluntarily and inten-
tionally and not because of mistake or accident or other innocent rea-
son. The purpose of adding the word 'knowingly' is to ensure that no
one would be convicted for an act done because of mistake or accident
or innocent reason. '26 2 The lower court then described the relationship
between intent and deliberate ignorance:
In order to convict the defendant in this case, you must find that
he acted knowingly.
It is not necessary, however, for the Government to prove that the
defendant was aware of every detail of the alleged scheme to defraud,
so long as you find beyond a reasonable doubt that he was a knowing
259. 328 F.2d 854 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 953 (1964).
260. The court stated:
[I]n the context of § 24 of the Securities Act as applied to § 17(a), the Govern-
ment can meet its burden by proving that a defendant deliberately closed his
eyes to facts he had a duty to see,. . . Model Penal Code § 2.02(7) commen-
tary in Tentative Draft No. 4, at 129-30 (1955) .... In our complex society
the accountant's certificate and the lawyer's opinion can be instruments for
inflicting pecuniary loss more potent than the chisel or the crowbar. Of course,
Congress did not mean that any mistake of law or misstatement of fact should
subject an attorney or an accountant to criminal liability simply because more
skillful practitioners would not have made them. But Congress equally could
not have intended that men holding themselves out as members of these an-
cient professions should be able to escape criminal liability on a plea of igno-
rance when they have shut their eyes to what was plainly to be seen or have
represented a knowledge they knew they did not possess.
Id. at 862-63.
261. 710 F.2d 639 (10th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1005 (1984).
262. Id. at 643 n.4.
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participant in the scheme.
It is not sufficient for you to find beyond a reasonable doubt that
Mr. Glick knew the financial statements were used to guarantee loans,
since such transactions are legal. For you to convict Mr. Glick, you
must find beyond a reasonable doubt that he was aware of the fraudu-
lent aspects of the transactions.
However, the element of knowledge may be established by proof
that a defendant deliberately closed his eyes to what otherwise would
have been obvious to him. In other words, the requirement that the
defendant has acted knowingly does not mean that the defendant
needed to have positive knowledge. If the defendant failed to have
positive knowledge only because he conscientiously avoided acquiring
it, the requirement of knowledge is satisfied . . ..
It is not sufficient to merely prove that Steven Glick prepared
fraudulent financial statements. The prosecution must also prove be-
yond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Glick knowingly participated in the
scheme or artifice involved in this case. Thus, if you find that Mr.
Glick prepared fraudulent financial statements but did not intention-
ally and knowingly participate in the scheme or artifice involved in
this case, you must find him not guilty.263
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit upheld the instruction, though it ob-
served it would have preferred the trial court add the following lan-
guage from the leading conscious avoidance 'case of United States v.
Jewell:204 "(1) that the required knowledge is established if the accused
is aware of a high probability of the existence of the fact in question,
(2) unless he actually believes it does not exist.
'265
Likewise, in two other cases where CPAs were prosecuted, United
States v. Weiner280 and United State v. Natelli,26 7 judges approved
instructions that allowed the juries to infer willful and knowing crimi-
263. Id.
264. 532 F.2d 697, 704 n.21 (9th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 951 (1976).
265. Glick, 710 F.2d at 643. The quoted language from Jewell is taken directly from
the Model Penal Code's articulation in § 2.02(7) of the type of conduct that satisfies a
knowledge requirement as to the "existence of a particular fact." Inclusion of the lan-
guage in a deliberate ignorance jury charge appears mandatory in the Second, Ninth, and
Tenth Circuits. See United States v. Feroz, 848 F.2d 359, 361 (2d Cir. 1988) ("By now
our message should be clear: the prosecutor should request that the 'high probability'
and 'actual belief' language be incorporated into every conscious avoidance charge");
United States v. Manriquez Arbizo, 833 F.2d 244, 249 (10th Cir. 1987) (calling inclusion
of the language "preferable" in order "[tio insure that a defendant is only convicted if
his ignorance is willful, rather than negligent"); Jewell, 532 F.2d at 704 n.21. The lan-
guage is not mandatory in the Eighth or Fifth Circuits. See United States v. Hiland, 909
F.2d 1114, 1130 (8th Cir. 1990); United States v. Deveau, 734 F.2d 1023, 1028 (5th Cir.
1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1158 (1985).
266. 578 F,2d 757 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 981 (1978).
267. 527 F.2d 311 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 934 (1976).
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nal securities violations based on the defendant auditors' "reckless de-
liberate indifference to or disregard for truth or falsity. ' 268 In both
cases, the reviewing courts called attention to the investigatory or
truth-finding role played by the accountants by virtue of their position
as auditors.2 69 Given their special public responsibility, the defendants'
inaction in the face of the suspect facts before them supported an in-
ference of knowing complicity.
Lawyers faced with the prospect of furthering clients' questionable
transactions should study United States v. Kehm7 0 and United States
v. Sarantos.27 1 Both cases involved criminal convictions of lawyers
caught up in their clients' criminal activities, and in both cases deliber-
ate avoidance instructions were used to convict. In Kehm, Greenberg, a
lawyer, was convicted based on an ostrich instruction where the facts
showed that he had organized the company used to facilitate the trans-
portation of drugs by airplane, that he knew the company's directors
used pseudonyms, and that when the use of the plane came up at a
meeting, Greenberg left, "with the remark that he didn't want to hear
about it. '272 In Sarantos, the lawyer was convicted for having violated
the federal false statement statute273 and for having aided and abetted
false statements and violations of the immigration laws by processing
paperwork relating to sham marriages. The jury charge explained that
Sarantos could be found to have violated the false statement statute if
"he knew . .. [the statements] were false and that he wilfully and
knowingly participated in furthering the conduct. '27 The charge de-
fined "knowingly and wilfully as meaning that 'one knows what he or
she is doing, as distinguished from an inadvertent or careless act' ")275
and directed that the jury could conclude Sarantos "acted with reck-
less disregard of whether the statements made were true or with a con-
scious effort to avoid learning the truth. . . even though you may find
that he was not specifically aware of the facts which would establish
the falsity of the statements.
2 76
Sarantos objected to the instruction on the ground that its appli-
268. Weiner, 578 F.2d at 786, 787; Natelli, 527 F.2d at 322-23.
269. See Weiner, 578 F.2d at 787; Natelli, 527 F.2d at 323.
270. 799 F.2d 354 (7th Cir. 1986).
271. 455 F.2d 877 (2d'Cir. 1972).
272. Kehm, 799 F.2d at 362.
273. 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1988).
274. Sarantos, 455 F.2d at 880.
275. Id.
276. Id. The appellate court conceded, in the face of Sarantos' objection that "and"
would have been a better word than "or," but found any error caused by confusion to be
harmless since "Et]he phrases 'reckless disregard of whether the statements made were
true' and 'conscious purpose to avoid learning the truth' mean essentially the same
thing." Id. at 882. The court "urged" the use of "and" in future charges. Id.
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cation to him, a lawyer, would "radically alter the attorney-client rela-
tionship and make the attorney 'an investigative arm of the govern-
ment.' "27 The Second Circuit rejected the argument, finding that the
purpose of a deliberate avoidance instruction is to close a potential
loophole and thereby "prevent an individual like Sarantos from cir-
cumventing criminal sanctions merely by deliberately closing his eyes
to the obvious risk that he is engaging in unlawful conduct. 2 7s The
Second Circuit drew support from Leary v. United States2 79 and
Model Penal Code section 2.02(7) for its view that deliberate avoidance
permits an inference of knowledge. 280 The distinctly liberal, pro-prose-
cution slant of the intent instructions approved by the Second Circuit
in Sarantos is at odds with the same circuit's pronounced reluctance to
find scienter on the part of professionals in civil, white collar fraud
cases.
Another business-related willful avoidance case is United States v.
Caliendo,281 a criminal RICO case involving a prostitution enterprise.
One of the defendants was Susan Barker, a former prostitute and the
enterprise owner's "live-in girlfriend. '28 2 Barker denied "knowingly vi-
olating a federal law," despite proof that "she handled the records and
receipts of an illicit business connected to the conspiratorial enterprise
and managed an adult bookstore whose operation was closely affiliated
with (if not subsumed by) an integral conspiratorial establishment
1)283
Barker's denial of knowledge was answered with the following os-
trich instruction which led to conviction: "You may infer knowledge
from a combination of suspicion and indifference to the truth. If you
find that a person had a strong suspicion that things were not what
they seemed or that someone had withheld some important facts, yet
277. Id. at 880.
278. Id.
279. 395 U.S. 6 (1969).
280. Sarantos, 455 F.2d at 881. The court also reiterated its earlier approval of the
Model Penal Code definition of "knowledge" in United States v. Squires, 440 F.2d 859,
863 (2d Cir. 1971): "This formulation (Model Penal Code 2.07(7)) is merely a more com-
prehensive version of the lay definition of 'knowledge' in that it recognizes that there are
many facts which one does not 'know with certainty,' and it comports with the use of
'knowingly' in other criminal statutes." Id. at 884.
281. 910 F.2d 429 (7th Cir. 1990).
282. Id. at 433.
283. Id. at 434. The bookstore was adjacent to a spa which served as a house of
prostitution. The evidence showed that Barker had discussed a plan to have female spa
employees, i.e., prostitutes, serve as "movie critics" for bookstore customers who watched
movies in the bookstore's booths. Id. Such circumstantial evidence of knowledge, coupled
with Barker's denial of knowledge of impropriety, validated the prosecution's use of an
ostrich instruction to permit the jury to find culpable intent. Id.
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shut his or her eyes for fear of what he or she would learn, you may
conclude that he or she acted knowingly, as I have used that word."
28'
In affirming, the Seventh Circuit noted that limits exist to such an in-
struction's application: The ostrich instruction is not, however, an all-
purpose instruction appropriate under any circumstance. The instruc-
tion is "properly given only when the defendant claims a lack of guilty
knowledge and there are facts and evidence that support an inference
of deliberate ignorance."'8 5
Plainly, deliberate avoidance theory ideally is suited for large-
scale, enterprise-related misconduct facilitated by professionals. The
Seventh Circuit explained in United States v. Diaz,
2 6
The ostrich instruction has been principally employed where there is
evidence that the defendant is associated with a group, but where
there is also evidence that the defendant consciously was avoiding
knowledge of the illegal nature of the group's activity. In most cases,
the defendant acknowledges his association with the group but, de-
spite circumstantial evidence to the contrary, denies knowledge of the
group's illegal activity.
2 7
Although professionals do not usually supply the prosecution with di-
rect evidence showing their cold-blooded, deliberate, premeditated in-
tent to violate criminal law, such direct evidence of knowledge or in-
tent rarely will be necessary to convict if an inference of knowledge or
intent can be derived from conscious avoidance of the truth. Indeed, in
one prosecution under the Mail Fraud Statute,2 8 a crime requiring
proof of scienter or "intent to defraud"2 8 9 beyond a reasonable doubt,
the First Circuit equated proof of scienter with conscious avoidance.
2 0
284. Id. at 433.
285. Id. (citation omitted).
286. 864 F.2d 544, 550 (7th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1070 (1989).
287. As examples, see United States v. Bank of New England, 821 F.2d 844, 855 (1st
Cir.) (approving an instruction permitting an inference of knowledge "if a defendant
consciously avoided learning about the reporting requirements" in the prosecution of a
bank under the Currency Transaction Reporting Act), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 943 (1987);
United States v. Ramsey, 785 F.2d 184 (7th Cir.) (employees of fraudulent loan broker-
age operation claimed they were gullible and ignorant of criminal activities), cert. de-
nied, 476 U.S. 1186 (1986); United States v. Schwartz, 787 F.2d 257 (7th Cir. 1986) (de-
fendants claimed they had been duped in an auto insurance fraud scheme in which they
had played roles; the jury was entitled to be told that a person who smells a rat and then
avoids actual knowledge may already know enough for the purpose of the law); United
States v. Josefik, 753 F.2d 585 (7th Cir.) (involvement in transfer of stolen scotch), cert.
denied, 471 U.S. 1055 (1985).
288. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1988).
289. United States v. Martin-Trigona, 684 F.2d 485, 492 (7th Cir. 1982).
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Likewise, in United States v. Josefik,291 a conscious avoidance instruc-
tion was used to define intent to deceive. Josefik involved a prosecu-
tion for receiving stolen property.292 The jury instruction used to con-
vict was upheld on appeal; it explained that "[n]o person can
intentionally avoid knowledge by closing his eyes to facts which should
prompt him to investigate.
2 9 3
United States Supreme Court precedent teaches that "[c]riminal
liability is normally based upon the concurrence of two factors, 'an
evil-meaning mind [and] an evil-doing hand.' ,,294 A review of recent
criminal cases shows that juries are entitled to ascertain what was in
defendants' minds or caused defendants' hands to move by studying
the defendants' eyes. If those eyes were deliberately averted from clues
showing participation in crime that was plain to see, a jury is entitled
to infer the presence of guilty knowledge sufficient to convict.
B. Evidentiary Factors to Determine Scienter in Civil Cases
In fraud cases against professionals, direct evidence of intent usu-
ally is lacking. As a result, the scienter issue normally must be resolved
by inferences drawn from the "nature and purpose of the actor's con-
duct and the circumstances known" 295 to the actor. General definitions
of scienter surely are useful, but specific facts should be weighed in
individual cases. In evaluating factors relevant to a plaintiff's recklegs-
ness, one 10b-5 case has cautioned that "[n]o single factor is determi-
native; all relevant factors must be considered and balanced."29 6
If an array of factors deserves scrutiny in evaluating the behavior
of a securities fraud victim, it is not extreme to suggest that the same
ought to be true for the perpetrator. Indeed, the Ninth Circuit held as
much when it promulgated its list of factors used to determine culpa-
bility under the now discarded "flexible duty" standard.2 97 An exami-
291. 753 F.2d 585 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1055 (1985).
292. This involved an alleged violation of 18 U.S.C. § 569 (1976).
293. Josefik, 753 F.2d at 589.
294. United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 402 (1980) (quoting Morissette v. United
States, 342 U.S. 246, 251 (1952)).
295. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(c) (1985).
296. Zobrist v. Coal-X, Inc., 708 F.2d 1511, 1516-17 (10th Cir. 1983).
297. The Ninth Circuit's "flexible duty" test required courts to consider the follow-
ing factors:
(1) the relationship of defendant to plaintiff; (2) defendant's access to the in-
formation as compared to that of plaintiff; (3) defendant's benefit derived from
the relationship; (4) defendant's awareness of whether plaintiff was relying on
their relationship it. making his or her investment decisions; and (5) defend-
ant's activity in initiating the transaction in question.
Zweig v. Hearst Corp., 594 F.2d 1261, 1268 (9th Cir. 1979) (paraphrasing White v.
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nation of the defendant's culpability always will need to be shaped to
the particular actor's individual circumstances. However, various ge-
neric avenues of inquiry concerning the actor's behavior need to be ex-
plored by courts and counsel in every case when scienter is or may be
alleged. An analysis of cases against professionals shows that the fol-
lowing factors provided significant evidentiary indicia of scienter: (1)
motive, including the professional's financial interest in the transac-
tion; (2) sophistication of the fraud victims; (3) substantial participa-
tion by the professional in effectuating the transaction; (4) the profes-
sional's close relationship with other wrongdoers; (5) any unusual
aspects of the transaction; and (6) evidence of the professional's "con-
scious avoidance" of facts proving participation in fraud.
1. Motive, Including the Professional's Financial Interest in the
Transaction
An important, though not dispositive, factor in a scienter case re-
lates to motive to defraud. Financial gain realized or to be realized
through the scheme may be seen as evidence that the professional
joined hands with other wrongdoers. As the Seventh Circuit said in
Barker v. Henderson, Franklin, Starnes & Holt 298 "If the plaintiff
does not have direct evidence of scienter, the court should ask whether
the fraud (or cover-up) was in the interest of the defendants. Did they
gain by bilking the buyers of the securities?"299 Financial inducements
giving counsel a slice of the venture akin to a sales commission can
provide a motive to defraud.300 The professional's financial incentive
should be viewed, however, only as a factor, and not as an essential
requirement for liability.301
Abrams, 495 F.2d 724, 735-36 (9th Cir. 1974)).
298. 797 F.2d 490, 497 (7th Cir. 1986).
299. Griffin v. McNiff, 744 F. Supp. 1237 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (evidence of scienter in
the form of profit incentive on the part of two different law firms); Boltz v. Flagship
Partners Ltd. Partnership, 1990 WL 125411 (N.D. IlM. Aug. 22, 1990) (WESTLAW) (de-
fendant's conflict of interest viewed as suggesting he may have had an incentive to mis-
lead one of the parties reposing trust in him).
300. See In re Federal Bank & Trust Co., [1984 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 91,565 (D. Ore. 1984) (upholding RICO claim against opining lawyers who re-
ceived an undisclosed contingent fee of one-half percent of the money raised from
investors).
301. In Barker the Seventh Circuit suggested that an allegation of scienter made
against an attorney could be rebutted when "it is inconceivable that [the lawyers] joined
a venture to feather their nests by defrauding investors." 797 F.2d at 497. See also
Schlifke v. Seafirst Corp., 866 F.2d 935, 948 n.14 (7th Cir. 1989) (unsupported allegations
of bank's economic stake in oil and gas limited partnership not sufficient to infer scien-
ter). The court in Mercer v. Jaffe, Snider, Raitt & Heuer, P.C., 736 F. Supp. 764 (W.D.
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Another means of showing motive is to present facts revealing the
professional's desire to keep from disclosing past or ongoing miscon-
duct.30 2 It should be noted that under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b),
evidence of a professional's other wrongs or acts may be admissible to
prove motive, plan, intent, knowledge, or absence of mistake.3 0 3 Thus,
evidence that a lawyer had in the past prepared fake invoices in con-
nection with a scheme to defraud may be relevant to show that the
attorney aided and abetted mail fraud rather than being duped by his
clients. 0
2. The Fraud Victim's Sophistication
As noted above, the Second Circuit has gone so far as to change
the required culpability standard upward solely based on the nonexis-
tence of a fiduciary relationship between the parties in an aider and
abettor case.3 0 5 The Seventh Circuit's demand that aders and abettors
in 10b-5 cases be proved to have violated "positive law" requiring them
Mich. 1990), followed Barker's strict emphasis on motive based on monetary gain in re-
fusing to find scienter on the part of the defendant lawyer:
[T]he record contains nothing upon which the jury could reasonably conclude
that Karpen stood to gain by "bilking" the Mercer plaintiffs. See Barker, 797
F.2d at 497. Karpen was not being paid by the Diamond entities. Id. He in fact
had "everything to lose" by "join[ing] common cause" with the Diamond enti-
ties, including his professional reputation and perhaps even his personal lib-
erty. Id. Under these circumstances, "it is inconceivable that [Karpen] joined a
venture to feather [his nest] by defrauding" investors in the Diamond and
CMI securities.
Id. at 773. Far less sympathetic was the district court in Blakely v. Lisac, 357 F. Supp.
255, 263 (D. Ore. 1972), which held that the absence of profit was irrelevant and imposed
10b-5 liability on a nonlawyer finder whose name, status as a financial advisor, and
$2,500 fee were mentioned in a misleading prospectus, the accuracy of which the finder
had taken no steps to investigate. It should be noted that proof of a financial incentive
for a professional to engage in fraud has never been required in criminal prosecutions.
See United States v. Natelli, 527 F.2d 311, 319 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 934
(1976); United States v. Simon, 425 F.2d 796, 809 (2d Cir. 1969), 'cert. denied, 397 U.S.
1006 (1970).
302. Natelli, 527 F.2d at 319.
303. FED. R. EVID. 404(b) provides: "Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not
admissible to prove the character of the person in order to show action in conformity
therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive
... intent ... knowledge ... or absence of mistake or accident."
304. See United States v. Gonzalez-Sanchez, 825 F.2d 572 (lst Cir.), cert. denied,
484 U.S. 989 (1987).
305. Ross v. Bolton, 904 F.2d 819 (2nd Cir. 1990); see supra note 79 and accompa-
nying text. In Schatz v. Rosenberg, 943 F.2d 485 (4th Cir. 1991) the Fourth Circuit em-
braced the fiduciary duty view and expanded it to include confidential relationships.
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to disclose the truth"0 6 is but a reformulation of the Second Circuit's
invention. The Fifth Circuit adopted a similar approach in Abell v. Po-
tomac Insurance Co., protecting a reckless firm that operated out of
view.$07 Each of these circuits appears to have adjusted the scienter
formulation based on the single factor of the parties' relationship.
However, if in judging culpability of behavior, "[n]o single factor is de-
terminative, [and] all relevant factors must be considered and bal-
anced,"308 then it is wrong to turn the relationship of the parties into a
litmus test for culpability.
This is not to say, however, that the relationship between profes-
sionals involved in the transaction and investors is irrelevant. The rela-
tive sophistication of the parties to the transaction is and should re-
ceive careful scrutiny when there is a need to determine intent. The
actor's sophistication and expertise naturally will tend to cut against
professionals caught up in fraudulent schemes, particularly those who
are performing as specialists. When the scheme involves unsophistica-
ted members of the public, an inference of fraudulent intent is more
likely to be warranted. The First Circuit pointed out in United States
v. MacDonald & Watson Waste Oil Co.30 that an inference of fraudu-
lent intent "is more particularly allowable when the actors or utterers
are persons 'in a far better position to judge than the unsophisticated
public to whom they sold.' "310
3. Substantial Participation by the Professional in Effectuating
the Transaction
Professionals who are involved intimately in fraudulent transac-
tions should expect their performance to be scrutinized closely. The
Model Penal Code's emphasis in its "recklessness" definition on the
nature and purpose of the actor's conduct suggests that the extent of
the actor's involvement in the transaction is an important factor in de-
termining intent.
Whether the professional rendered an opinion or prepared docu-
ments crucial to the effectuation of the transaction is a particularly
important factor in the analysis of intent,311 especially when the mater-
306. DiLeo v. Ernst & Young, 901 F.2d 624, 628 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct.
347 (1990). See supra notes 80-82 and accompanying text.
307. See supra notes 83-90 and accompanying text.
308. Zobrist v. Coal-X, Inc., 708 F.2d 1511, 1516-17 (10th Cir. 1983).
309. 933 F.2d 35 (1st Cir. 1990).
310. Id. at 54 n.19 (quoting United States v. Avant, 275 F.2d 650, 653 (D.C. Cir.
1960)).
311. In Wassel v. Eglowsky, 399 F. Supp. 1330 (D. Md. 1975), afl'd, 542 F.2d 1235
(4th Cir. 1976), a contribution claim based on joint tortfeasor theory was allowed against
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ials flow directly to the public.3 12 As one court observed, fraud liability
may await "one who permits another to use his reputation and good
will to further a fraudulent scheme. 3 13 In these cases the professional
is in the best position to assure that honest communications are made
and is most likely to be aware that injury can result if the truth is not
brought out. The professional who, acting as gatekeeper, controls ac-
cess to needed information and determines what is said and not said,
accepts great responsibility and, with it, great risk.31' The Second Cir-
cuit emphasized in a criminal prosecution against CPAs:
[I]t simply cannot be true that an accountant is under no duty to
disclose what he knows when he has reason to believe that, to a mate-
rial extent, a corporation is being operated not to carry out its busi-
ness in the interest of all the stockholders but for the private benefit
of its president. . . . If certification does not at least imply that the
corporation has not been looted by insiders so far as the accountants
know... it would mean nothing, and the reliance placed on it by the
public would be a snare and a delusion. 315
Commenting on the role of attorneys in papering deals and in render-
ing opinions, an SEC Commissioner once observed: "Lawyers are not
corporate counsel whose opinion letter improperly freed stock for transfer. The lawyer's
opinion was no more essential to the transaction than usual, but the court honed in on
evidence of the attorney's questionable conduct and found that his opinion was a proxi-
mate cause of the transaction. See id. at 1369-70. SEC v. Rogers, 790 F.2d 1450 (9th Cir.
1986) shows that a legal opinion can play a crucial role in the deal. In Rogers a divided
circuit court affirmed the dismissal of SEC charges against a tax shelter salesman. In
dissent, Judge Noonan complained that the lower court should be reversed, in part be-
cause the defendant had supplied facts upon which the tax opinion for the deal was
based. According to Judge Noonan, "The tax opinion was vital. Without it, there would
have been no sale." Id. at 1462 (Noonan, J., dissenting).
312. The district court in In re North Am. Acceptance Corp. Sec. Cases, 513 F.
Supp. 608, 626 (N.D. Ga. 1981), a 10b-5 aider and abettor case against a law firm that
passed on advertisements and gave an opinion on the need to distribute offering material
to investors, specifically noted the firm's close proximity to the public in deciding to use
a less rigorous scienter standard than would have applied had the firm's contact been
more remote from the public. The court was correct in viewing the professional's key role
as a factor to be weighed in analyzing the professional's culpability. The court's error was
to presume that the scienter standard changes depending on the professional's proximity
to investors.
313. Blakely v. Lisac, 357 F. Supp. 255, 263 (D. Ore. 1972). See also Rudolph v.
Arthur Andersen & Co., 800 F.2d 1040 (11th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 946 (1987).
314. Eisenberg v. Gagnon, 766 F.2d 770, 776 (3d Cir.) (reversing judgment for de-
fendant lawyer-opiner in tax shelter case; "those with greater access to information or
having a special relationship to investors making use of the information" have an obliga-
tion to disclose data indicating that the opinion or forecast may be doubtful), cert. de-
nied, 474 U.S. 134 (1985).
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paid in the amounts they are to put the representations of their clients
into good English, or to give opinions which assert a pure state of facts
upon which any third-year law student could confidently express an
opinion.' '311
4. The Professional's Close Relationship with Wrongdoers
Professionals who wear the additional hat of an insider-executive
in the transaction should expect more rigorous scrutiny than if they
had worked purely as professionals on the periphery.
17
In Shumate v. McNiffl1 s the court upheld 10b-5 allegations by in-
vestors asserted against the Ruffa & Hanover law firm which had been
involved intimately in the securities offering and had rendered tax
opinions. The court made clear the danger that awaits lawyers who be-
come involved personally in their clients' business activities:
Defendants argue that plaintiffs have failed to meet the require-
ment for pleading scienter under Rule 9(b), because they allege only
that Ruffa, Hanover and R & H "knew or should have known" of the
various alleged misstatements. In addition, defendants assert, unless
facts are alleged which indicate otherwise, a lawyer is presumed to act
in good faith on information provided by his or her client. See SEC v.
Frank, 388 F.2d 486, 489 (2d Cir. 1968).
The Court finds, however, that plaintiffs have pleaded sufficient
facts to give rise to an inference of knowledge on the part of defend-
ants Ruffa, Hanover and R & H. Plaintiffs have alleged that Ruffa,
together with McNiff, owned an option to purchase 66.66% of the
stock of the parent corporation. Ruffa is presumed, then, to have had
knowledge of the actual operations of the Lps and the fraudulent
scheme alleged by plaintiffs. In addition, Ruffa's option gave him a
sufficient motive to conceal his knowledge in order to cash in on his
investment. Accordingly, since Ruffa was a senior partner of R & H, it
may be inferred that his partner, Hanover, had knowledge of the
fraudulent scheme, and that knowledge is imputed to their law firm,
R & H.3 19
Insider status and financial motive, of course, may be intertwined,
316. Sommer, The Emerging Responsibilities of the Securities Lawyer, reprinted in
D. RATNER & T. HAZEN, SEcuarris REGULATION 530-31 (4th ed. 1991).
317. Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622, 651 (1988) (expressing concern that a liberal read-
ing of § 12 of the Securities Act of 1933 "might expose securities professionals, such as
accountants and lawyers, whose involvement is only the performance of their profes-
sional services, to § 12(1) strict liability"); Capri v. Murphy, 856 F.2d 473 (2d Cir. 1988)
(lawyers functioned as insiders); In re Professional Fin. Management, Ltd., 692 F. Supp.
1057 (D. Minn. 1988) (insider involvement by lawyer).
318. 1990 WL 6549 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 23, 1990) (WESTLAW).
319. Id. at 5.
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as indeed they were in Shumate. This is exemplified by a district
court's decision in In re Rospatch Securities Litigation.20 The court
upheld scienter allegations in a securities fraud case against a com-
pany's law firm and its managing partner, who was also a company
director. The court pointed to four factors providing an inference of
scienter: (1) the company was one of the firm's major clients; (2) as a
director, the law firm's managing partner had a direct interest in keep-
ing the price of the client's stock high; (3) the firm had handled all of
the transactions attacked as improper; 21 and (4) the law firm allegedly
manipulated its client's business relations to generate business for the
law firm. 32 2 On the other hand, it will be recalled that the Weinberg &
Green firm in Schatz v. Rosenberg allegedly had its fingerprints all
over the fraudulent deal's paperwork and allegedly was paid from the
proceeds of the fraud, but, nonetheless, the Fourth Circuit held that
under no set of circumstances could the victims even allege a cause of
action against the firm.
323
5. Any Unusual Aspects of the Transaction
Participation in a transaction of an unusual nature ought to put
the professional on guard.32 4 A jury should be allowed to draw an ad-
verse inference against a professional who fails to exercise special cir-
320. 760 F. Supp. 1239 (W.D. Mich. 1991).
321. The court cited In re Citisource, Inc. Sec. Litig., 694 F. Supp. 1069, 1083
(S.D.N.Y. 1988), for the proposition that the degree of a law firm's involvement as is-
suer's counsel in a fraudulent securities issue might warrant an inference of scienter.
Rospatch, 760 F. Supp. at 1253.
322. Roapatch, 760 F. Supp. at 1253.
323. See supra notes 97-109 and accompanying text.
324. See, e.g., United States v. Nicholson, 677 F.2d 706, 710-11 (9th Cir. 1982) (pro-
ceeding with transaction in the face of highly suspicious circumstances provides a basis
for invocation of a deliberate ignorance instruction). When the opinion or forecast is
based on underlying materials which on their face or under the circumstances suggest
that they cannot be relied on without further inquiry, then the failure to investigate
further may "support an inference that when [the defendant] expressed the opinion it
had no genuine belief that it had the information on which it could predicate that opin-
ion." Eisenberg v. Gagnon, 766 F.2d 770, 776 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 946 (1985).
In reversing a jury finding of aider and abettor liability on the part of counsel for
the underwriters in Abell v. Potomac Ins. Co., 858 F.2d 1104 (5th Cir. 1988), cert. de-
nied, 492 U.S. 918 (1989), the circuit court took into account that the firm provided
"only legal services that '[constitute] the daily grist of the mill' of a law firm with a
substantial securities practice." Id. at 1128 (citing Woodward v. Metro Bank, 522 F.2d
84, 97 (5th Cir. 1975)). The implication is that the lawyers were entitled to be more lax
in handling what was for them a routine transaction. A less protective court could have
used the fact that the defendant lawyers had a "substantial securities practice," as a
negative feature. Specialists, after all, are held to a higher standard of care than those
who lack special skills. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF AGENCY § 379 (1957).
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cumspection in the face of facts reflecting grave risk. The Sixth Circuit
has stated: "'If the alleged aider and abettor conducts what appears to
be a transaction in the ordinary course of his business, more evidence
of his complicity is essential.' . . . Conversely, if the alleged aider and
abettor conducts a transaction of an extraordinary nature, less evi-
dence of his complicity is necessary."325 A failure to exercise increased
diligence in the face of warning signs evidences connivance.26 The
Tenth Circuit pointed this out when it observed:
When someone knows enough to put him on inquiry, he knows
much. If a person with a lurking suspicion goes on as before and
avoids further knowledge, this may support an inference that he has
deduced the truth and is simply trying to avoid giving the appearance
(and incurring the consequences) of knowledge.
3 27
Thus, in United States v. Simon3 28 accountants were convicted for
giving a fraudulent opinion when, at the very outset of their audit,
they were aware that the client's daily check float was enormous, the
client's comptroller was juggling cash, and a suspicious intercompany
receivable had ballooned to huge size. The accountant who reported
these alarming details had added, "all in all, it promises to be an 'in-
teresting' audit.
' 329
325. SEC v. Washington County Util. Dist., 676 F.2d 218, 226 (6th Cir. 1982) (quot-
ing Woodward v. Metro Bank, 522 F.2d 84, 95 (5th Cir. 1975)) (discussing the "general
awareness" element of Rule 10(b)-5 aiding and abetting liability). See also Pinter v.
Dahl, 486 U.S. 622, 651 (1988) (expressing concern that a too-liberal reading of § 12
under the Securities Act of 1933 "might expose securities professionals, such as account-
ants and lawyers, whose involvement is only the performance of their professional ser-
vices, to § 12(1) strict liability"); Woodward v. Metro Bank, 522 F.2d 84, 97 (5th Cir.
1975) ("if the method or transaction is atypical or lacks business justification, it may be
possible to infer the knowledge necessary for aiding and abetting liability").
326. See Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486, 1530 n.10
(M.D. Fla. 1991) ("If a person with a lurking suspicion goes on as before and avoids
further knowledge, this may support an inference that he has deduced the truth and is
trying simply to avoid giving the appearance, and incurring the consequences, of knowl-
edge."). Warning signs need to be appreciated. In Abell v. Potomac Ins. Co., 858 F.2d
1104, 1125 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 918 (1989), the Fifth Circuit generously
protected a securities firm that recklessly participated in a securities fraud, noting
"plaintiffs must prove more than that the abettor recklessly ignored danger signals."
Professionals should not count on always receiving insulation from accountability, how-
ever, when the risk of assisting impropriety is palpable. After all, MODEL PENAL CODE §
2.02(7) (1985) presents a generally accepted knowledge definition that provides that
knowledge of a particular fact "is established if a person is aware of a high probability of
its existence, unless he actually believes it does not exist." A professional who ignores the
danger signals of a fraudulent scheme's existence is asking for trouble.
327. United States v. De Francisco-Lopez, 939 F.2d 1405, 1409 (10th Cir. 1991).
328. 425 F.2d 796, 809 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1006 (1970).
329. Id. at 802. It will be recalled that in two cases when courts convicted account-
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Another case on point is SEC v. Martin.330 There, the SEC fleshed
out its stance on what lawyers must do upon receipt of notice of
wrongdoing. In that case the Commission obtained a consent order
against a lawyer who had prepared six tax opinions that were included
in offering materials. The lawyer also had reviewed and edited the of-
fering materials and responded to investors' questions. The lawyer was
charged with ignoring what the Commission called "red flags." Accord-
ing to the SEC, the red flags, such as notice that the client-issuer's
offices were unoccupied, "should have caused Martin to require further
information from the promoters or, falling to acquire the requested in-
formation. . . to withdraw his participation from the offering, and cor-
rect his previous misrepresentations.
'3 1
Similarly, in its recent ruling in Breard v. Sachnoff & Weaver,
Ltd. ,332 the Second Circuit emphasized to the bar that business lawyers
are to deal carefully with unusual facts that crop up in processing a
transaction. Ignoring or down-playing facts that ought to excite in-
quiry, such as that a key participant in the deal was just indicted or
convicted for fraud and conspiracy, is a recipe for disaster.
6. Evidence of "Conscious Avoidance" by the Professional of Direct
Involvement in Wrongdoing
Lawyers called on to plead and prove scienter in civil suits against
professionals can learn much by studying the burgeoning conscious
avoidance precedent being developed in criminal cases. Indeed, the
foreseeable, and foreseen, 333 migration of conscious avoidance theory to
the civil dockets already has begun. In Chanel, Inc. v. Italian Ac-
ants of criminal fraud, United States v. Weiner, 578 F.2d 757 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 981 (1978), and United States v. Natelli, 527 F.2d 311, 319 (2d Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 425 U.S. 934 (1976), the appellate courts directly referred to the important inves-
tigatory role inadequately discharged by the convicted auditors. See supra notes 266-69
and accompanying text.
330. [1983-1984 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 99,509 (D.D.C. 1983).
331. Id. 1 96,950. The unpleasantness at Salomon Brothers provides a current exam-
ple of how inaction in the face of warning signs may be taken as evidence of complicity.
Even if [Salomon's Messrs. Gutfeund and Strauss] somehow succeeded in
turning a blind eye to all five of the auctions in which Salomon has admitted
wrongdoing, they could hardly have failed to notice the larger-than-legal hold-
ings on the Salomon balance sheets. And if they knew, as they have admitted,
of a single violation in April, how did they permit the occurrence of another,
larger violation in May?
Lewis, A Liar's Obituary, Wall St. J., Aug. 21, 1991, at A12, cols. 3-4.
332. 941 F.2d 142 (2d Cir. 1991).
333. See Mathews, Shifting the Burden of Losses in the Securities Markets: The
Role of Civil RICO in Securities Litigation, 65 NoTRE DAm L. RE v. 896, 953 (1990).
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tivewear of Florida, Inc.,334 the Eleventh Circuit held that "willful
blindness" can provide the requisite intent or bad faith needed in a
civil treble damage trademark infringement action.
Stock fraud litigation likewise provides another fertile field for us-
ing conscious avoidance theory. Judge Haight of the Southern District
of New York recently observed in SEC v. Musella,3"5 a civil securities
enforcement action: "I cannot accept that conscious avoidance of
knowledge defeats scienter in a stock fraud case any more than it does
in the typical mens rea criminal context. To hold otherwise would sub-
vert the laws against fraudulent trading in securities. '336 Musella's em-
brace of conscious avoidance has been emulated in a private action.
3 7
Proof of scienter through inference drawn from conscious avoid-
ance is a tactic ideally suited to business fraud cases brought against
financiers, lawyers, and accountants.338 Their education, training, and
experience all militate in favor of the jury's finding that the defendant
professionals well understood what was going on. This was discussed
by the First Circuit recently in a prosecution for violations of environ-
mental laws:
"[T]here are many cases where from the actor's special situation and
continuity of conduct an inference that he did know the untruth of
what he said ... may legitimately be drawn." This is more particu-
larly allowable when the actors or utterers are persons in a far better
position to judge than the unsophisticated public .... This concept
has been consistently applied in federal courts.
We agree ... that knowledge may be inferred from circumstan-
tial evidence, including position and responsibility of defendants...
as well as information provided to those defendants on prior occa-
sions. Further willful blindness to the facts constituting the offense
may be sufficient to establish knowledge.339
The established propriety of conscious avoidance instructions in crimi-
nal conspiracy cases to establish knowledge of the conspiracy's fraudu-
lent goals 4' validates its use in civil cases to establish the alleged
wrongdoer's knowledge of the existence of a fraudulent scheme or a
334. 931 F.2d 1472 (11th Cir. 1991).
335. 678 F. Supp. 1060 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
336. Id. at 1063.
337. See Landau v. Vallen, 1990 WL 91777 (S.D.N.Y. June 25, 1990) (WESTLAW).
338. See supra notes 259-94 and accompanying text.
339. United States v. MacDonald & Watson Waste Oil Co., 933 F.2d 35, 54-55 &
n.19 (1st Cir. 1990) (citations omitted) (quoting United States v. Avant, 275 F.2d 650,
653 (D.C. Cir. 1960)).
340. See, e.g., United States v. Fletcher, 928 F.2d 495, 502 (2d Cir. 1991). A con-
scious avoidance charge is not proper to establish knowing and intentional participation
in the conspiracy, however. Id.
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pattern of racketeering activity.3 41
Plaintiffs' lawyers have several reasons for enthusiastically em-
bracing use of conscious avoidance allegations and precedent in civil
business fraud actions against professionals. First, convincing courts to
use criminal conscious avoidance cases or Model Penal Code formula-
tions as patterns for instructions in civil fraud cases should be rela-
tively easy, since a legal formulation of culpability sufficient to send a
wrongdoer to prison ought to suffice to prove the same issue in a civil
damage case brought by the miscreant's victims. 3 42 Second, conscious
avoidance theory allows the emphasis to be placed where it be-
longs-on facts and the inferences to be drawn from them, not on la-
bels. Third, it protects against the possibility the case will be lost be-
cause of the court's refusal to accept recklessness as equivalent to
intent or knowledge. Conscious avoidance theory permits the plaintiff
to argue that the defendant in a fraud case could not have had a genu-
ine belief that he or she was acting properly.3 43 Fourth, from a tactical
standpoint, the professional is likely to have a hard time rebutting an
inference of knowledge. The jury is apt to be skeptical of protestations
of ignorance coming from well-schooled, well-paid, experienced profes-
sionals. Finally, a conscious avoidance instruction permits the plaintiff
to appeal to the jury's common-sense, everyday understanding of life.
341. Thus, in United States v. Massa, 740 F.2d 629 (8th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471
U.S. 1115 (1985), a conscious avoidance instruction was used to establish knowledge of a
conspiracy in a securities prosecution brought against brokerage firm employees. The
court did not require proof the employees had detailed knowledge of the underlying
facts. Id. at 642. In United States v. Herrero, 893 F.2d 1512 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 110
S. Ct. 2623 (1990), a conscious avoidance instruction was upheld in an appeal of a lawyer
who was convicted of conspiracy for participating in money laundering activities for a
drug kingpin. And in United States v. Deveau, 734 F.2d 1023 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. de-
nied, 469 U.S. 1158 (1985), a willful blindness instruction was used to convict a lawyer
who participated, as an investor, in a securities fraud prosecution built around a corpo-
rate looting.
342. The Model Penal Code's drafters contemplated that its provisions would be
used to shape jury instructions. The Code's willful blindness provision, § 2.02(7), was
drafted specifically so it "clarifies the terms in which the issue [of knowledge] is submit-
ted to the jury." MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 comment 9, at 248 (1985). Discussing reck-
lessness, for example, the Code's commentary makes clear the intent that the provisions
should be adapted for jury instructions: "The Code proposes ... that the jury be asked
to measure the substantiality and unjustifiability of the risk by asking whether its disre-
gard, given the actor's perceptions, involved a gross deviation from the standard of con-
duct that a law-abiding person in the actor's position would observe." Id. comment 3, at
237.
343. Indeed, it is the defendant's own knowledge or the waywardness of his personal
conduct that lies at the core of scienter. E.g., Prosser & Keeton, supra note 13, § 107, at
742 ("A defendant who asserts a fact as of his own knowledge... when he knows that
he does not in fact know whether what he says is true, is found to have the intent to
deceive . . ").
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The defendant's destruction of a document,.premature departure from
a meeting, or announcement that, "I do not want to hear about it," are
events to which the jury may attach much meaning in the face of a
conscious avoidance instruction. That instruction is an open invitation
for the jury to evaluate the defendant's conduct based on what was
there to be seen, in the context in which the defendant saw it.
V. CONCLUSION
Professionals are not usually front-line troops in the execution of
swindles. They tend to operate on the periphery or in the background,
quietly providing their essential assistance, usually out of public view.
Civil courts have shown a tendency recently to be solicitous of profes-
sionals' interests. Some courts are inclined to change both the substan-
tive elements of wrongs and the applicable pleading requirements in
order to protect even reckless professionals from civil suits. No court
has explained precisely what valid public interest is served by protect-
ing irresponsible and reckless professionals from those proximately in-
jured by fraudulent schemes. Contemporaneously with this move to-
ward white collar protectiveness on the civil side, courts have moved in
the direction of pro-prosecutor liberality on the criminal side. In crimi-
nal cases, the principle of "conscious avoidance" has come into its own
as a flexible, highly useful means to prove criminal intent.
Though definition of culpability requirements is distinctly a legis-
lative prerogative, Congress has shown only slight interest in attempt-
ing to reconcile the terms actual knowledge, deliberate ignorance, or
recklessness when defining civil wrongs.-4 Absent legislative leadership
344. In creating civil liability under the federal "Qui Tam" Statute, Congress
equated actual knowledge with recklessness and deliberate ignorance:
[Tihe terms "knowing" and "knowingly" mean that a person, with respect to
information-
(1) has actual knowledge of the information;
(2) acts in deliberate ignorance of the truth or falsity of the information;
or
(3) acts in reckless disregard of the truth or falsity of the information,
and no proof of specific intent to defraud is required.
31 U.S.C. § 3729(b) (1988).
Likewise, government agencies may, through their rule-making powers, define key
culpability terms. For example, the Bureau of Land Management's regulations covering
proposals for non-Federal use of public lands provides:
"Knowing and willful" means that a violation is "knowingly and willfully"
committed if it constitutes the voluntary or conscious performance of an act
which is prohibited or the voluntary or conscious failure to perform an act or
duty that is required. The term does not include performances or failures to
perform which are honest mistakes or which are merely inadvertent. The term
includes, but does not require, performances or failures to perform which re-
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or regulators' willingness to draft coherent and consistent statutes or
regulations, lawyers are left to navigate based on logic and analogy,
and courts are left free to make political choices. Based on existing
precedents, courts seem more willing to find the requisite scienter in
cases brought on the criminal side, particularly when drug cartel mem-
bers are defendants. Professional defendants in civil cases have been
treated with considerable deference in some circuits. The same federal
judiciary that is prone to impose or affirm Rule 11 financial sanctions
on lawyers who negligently prepare papers filed in legal proceedings
has become strikingly blas6 about the accountability of lawyers who
further their clients' financial frauds through conduct that is at best
reckless. Some federal judges plainly are willing to tolerate lawyers
negligently or recklessly papering deals, so long as they, the judges, are
not the ones getting papered.
The cases demonstrate that lawyers in civil fraud cases can learn
much by studying the Model Penal Code's culpability standards and
criminal conscious avoidance precedent. The Model Penal Code's defi-
nitions, the conscious avoidance situation confronted in the Code's
knowledge definition,345 and language from jury instructions approved
in criminal conscious avoidance cases are readily adaptable to civil jury
instructions. These precedents from the criminal field will create
problems for the defense in civil cases brought against professionals.
Defendants in those cases will have a difficult time articulating how
legal principles embodied in a set of jury instructions that could lead
to jail time in a criminal fraud case can be unfairly harsh to the de-
fense in a civil damage suit.
Though it is improper to use a conscious avoidance instruction ab-
sult from a criminal or evil intent or from a specific intent to violate the law.
The knowing or willful nature of conduct may be established by plain indiffer-
ence to or reckless disregard of the requirements of law, regulations, orders, or
terms of a lease. A consistent pattern of performance or failure to perform also
may be sufficient to establish the knowing or willful nature of the conduct,
where such consistent pattern is neither the result of honest mistake or mere
inadvertency. Conduct which is otherwise regarded as being knowing or willful
is rendered neither accidental nor mitigated in character by the belief that the
conduct is reasonable or legal.
43 C.F.R. § 2920.0-5(m) (1990). Of course, there is a difference between having a defini-
tion, and having a definition that makes sense. In comparison with the Qui Tam Statute,
the regulation represents inferior drafting. The regulation holds that knowing conduct
can be established by "plain indifference." This reaches negligent conduct, despite the
claim that neither "honest" nor "inadvertent" mistakes are covered. If negligent conduct
was not meant to be covered, the adjectives "deliberate" or "conscious" should have
been used to modify "indifference." The protection the regulation gives "honest mis-
takes" is further undermined in the regulation's last sentence.
345. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(7) (1985); MODEL PENAL CODE & COMMENTARIES
§ 2.02, explanatory note 9, at 248 (1985).
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sent evidence of conduct that translates into conscious avoidance of
the truth,346 in many cases the professional's sophistication, access to
data, and critical role in furthering the fraudulent enterprise will com-
bine to provide a powerful inference of scienter. Quite simply, proof of
the professional's conscious avoidance of knowledge offers an ideal way
to prove guilty knowledge in many white collar cases that call for proof
of scienter.
Conversely, criminal lawyers eager for helpful precedent should
pay close attention to the pro-defense trend emerging in federal com-
mon-law cases under 10b-5. If immunity from civil liability under the
securities laws is deserved by reckless lawyers and accountants, then
why not immunity from criminal liability as well? If fraudulent profes-
sionals are immune from prosecution in 10b-5 civil cases on policy
grounds, can those same fraudulent acts be criminal? And why should
the immunity stop at the limits of the securities laws? Why should not
professionals who knowingly or recklessly further their clients' frauds
also enjoy immunity from liability under the mail fraud, wire fraud,
and false statement statutes? Are our federal courts on their way to
granting blanket immunity across all of criminal law to professionals
whose conduct is reckless or worse?
347
It is fair to wonder whether the sort of favoritism toward profes-
sionals evidenced so clearly by Schatz v. Rosenberg opens up an equal
protection problem. All other things being equal, why should a lay per-
son who does the same sort of thing as a lawyer to further a fraud face
civil or criminal liability when the lawyer would not? Skeptics are left
free to wonder how investor confidence is bolstered when courts con-
done truly egregious behavior by professionals who, in reality, serve as
the only check on fraudulent managements. Those managements, once
sued or indicted, can be counted on to try to hide behind their profes-
sional helpers, claiming good faith and professing that they were rely-
ing on the lawyers and accountants who papered the deal to speak up
if something was wrong. Are we not witnessing an erosion of standards
346. See, e.g., United States v. Manriquez Arbizo, 833 F.2d 244, 249 (10th Cir.
1987); United States v. Murrieta-Bejarano, 552 F.2d 1323, 1325 (9th Cir. 1977).
347. Fourth Circuit precedent indicates that the scienter standard in civil cases
against professionals is higher than in criminal cases (at least when the criminal defend-
ant is a nonprofessional). In Schatz, the Fourth Circuit demanded that the plaintiff es-
tablish that the lawyers' scienter equaled a "high conscious intent," coupled with a "con-
scious and specific motivation" to aid the fraud. Schatz v. Rosenberg, 943 F.2d 485, 496
(1991). In United States v. Hester, 880 F.2d 800 (4th Cir. 1989), however, the court af-
firmed a criminal conviction on a false statement charge based on a jury instruction that
equated criminal scienter with making a statement with a "deliberate disregard for its
truth or falsity with a conscious purpose to avoid learning the truth." Id. at 802. The
criminal scienter standard established by Hester seems more easily met than the civil
test set forth in Schatz.
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governing professional behavior in an era in which movement in the
opposite direction is more appropriate?
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